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Peer advice in a tax-evasion experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Florian Wakolbinger

    () (University of Linz)

  • Stefan Daniel Haigner

    () (University of Innsbruck)

Abstract

We examine peer effects in a tax-evasion experiment where subjects receive either advice or compliance data from participants with either above-median or below-median compliance rates in a control treatment. Both types of information on peer behavior yield significantly lower compliance rates than in the control group without any kind of information about peers. Receiving advice or compliance data from the pool of low-compliance participants yields the lowest compliance rates. We show that advice has a slightly bigger impact than observing the compliance of others and that subjects focus on payoff maximization rather than on tax morale when giving advice.

Suggested Citation

  • Florian Wakolbinger & Stefan Daniel Haigner, 2009. "Peer advice in a tax-evasion experiment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 29(3), pages 1653-1669.
  • Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-09-00366
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    File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/Pubs/EB/2009/Volume29/EB-09-V29-I3-P13.pdf
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Engel, 2016. "Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    2. Antonio Filippin & Paolo Crosetto, 2016. "A Reconsideration of Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(11), pages 3138-3160, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tax evasion; advice; experiments; social influence; peer effects;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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