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Reformbedarf in der EU-Bankenregulierung: Solvenz von Banken und Staaten entkoppeln

  • Johannes Pockrandt
  • Sören Radde
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    Recent developments in Ireland, Greece, and Spain have shown that sovereign debt crises endanger the solvency of domestic banking sectors, while banking crises in turn endanger the solvency of the domestic sovereign. This vicious circle between government and bank solvency is exacerbated by the home bias in banks' government bond portfolios, that is, the banks' excessive exposure to domestic government debt. Neither current European banking regulation nor plans to implement Basel III in the EU take this interdependence into account. Both treat government bonds of member states as risk-free, highly liquid assets and exclude them from capital requirements and large exposure regimes. Future EU banking regulations should aim to remedy this. Consequently, EU government bonds could be given risk weights specific to each country. At least in the euro area, however, a strict limitation of bank investments to cross-border sovereign debt without country-specific risk would be more effective. The advantage of this reform is that it could be integrated into a variety of scenarios for future government refinancing in the euro area. Jüngste Entwicklungen in Irland, Griechenland und Spanien zeigen: Finanzierungskrisen von Staaten gefährden deren Bankensektoren, Bankenkrisen die Zahlungsfähigkeit ihrer Heimatstaaten. Diese Kopplung von Staats- und Bankensolvenz wird durch den Home Bias im Staatsanleiheportfolio, also die exzessive Investition von Banken in heimische Staatsschuldtitel, noch verschärft. Diesem Zusammenhang tragen weder die geltende europäische Bankenregulierung Rechnung noch die Pläne zur Umsetzung von Basel III in der EU. Beide behandeln Staatsanleihen der Mitgliedstaaten pauschal als risikolose, hochliquide Anlagen und nehmen sie von Eigenkapitalunterlegungen sowie Größenbeschränkungen aus. Die künftige EU-Bankenregulierung sollte dies korrigieren. Dabei könnten EU-Staatsanleihen länderspezifische Risikogewichte erhalten. Zumindest in der Eurozone wäre jedoch eine strikte Beschränkung von Bankinvestitionen auf länderübergreifende staatliche Schuldtitel ohne länderspezifisches Risiko wirksamer. Der Vorzug dieser Reform: Sie ließe sich in verschiedenste Szenarien zur zukünftigen Staatsfinanzierung in der Eurozone integrieren.

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    Article provided by DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research in its journal DIW Wochenbericht.

    Volume (Year): 79 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 42 ()
    Pages: 3-10

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    Handle: RePEc:diw:diwwob:79-42-1
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