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Subsidy for New Technology Adoption in Duopoly with Differentiated Goods under Absolute and Relative Profit Maximization

Author

Listed:
  • Masahiko HATTORI

    (Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan.)

  • Yasuhito TANAKA

    (Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University, Kyoto, Japan.)

Abstract

We present an analysis about subsidy policy for adoption of new technology in duopoly with differentiated goods under absolute and relative profit maximization. Technology itself is free, however, firms must expend fixed set-up costs to adopt new technology. There are various cases about optimal policies depending on the level of the set-up cost and whether the goods of the firms are substitutes or complements. In particular, under relative profit maximization there is a case such that the social welfare is maximized when one firm adopts new technology, but no firm adopts new technology without subsidy. Then, the government should give a subsidy to only one firm. It is a discriminatory policy. The government gives a chance to receive a subsidy to only one firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Masahiko HATTORI & Yasuhito TANAKA, 2016. "Subsidy for New Technology Adoption in Duopoly with Differentiated Goods under Absolute and Relative Profit Maximization," Journal of Economics Library, EconSciences Journals, vol. 3(3), pages 411-428, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cvv:journ5:v:3:y:2016:i:3:p:411-428
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Jumpei Hamamura, 2022. "Weight assigned to a rival's profit by an advantaged firm in relative performance evaluation with Cournot–Bertrand competition," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 2838-2844, October.
    3. Jumpei Hamamura & Vinay Ramani, 2024. "The welfare effect of release timing of relative performance evaluation under quantity competition and asymmetric costs," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 71(3), pages 416-438, July.
    4. Jumpei Hamamura & Vinay Ramani, 2023. "Social performance versus relative performance evaluation, asymmetric costs, and quantity competition under managerial delegation," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(3), pages 1706-1719, April.
    5. Song, Yang & Sahut, Jean-Michel & Zhang, Zhiyuan & Tian, Yifan & Hikkerova, Lubica, 2022. "The effects of government subsidies on the sustainable innovation of university-industry collaboration," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 174(C).
    6. Masahiko Hattori & Yasuhito Tanaka, 2016. "License or entry with vertical differentiation in duopoly," Economics and Business Letters, Oviedo University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 17-29.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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