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The impact of agency costs on the investment performance of Australian pension funds

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  • COLEMAN, ANTHONY D. F.
  • ESHO, NEIL
  • WONG, MICHELLE

Abstract

This paper evaluates the overall investment performance of Australian pension funds by examining the determinants of risk-adjusted performance, and the relationship between risk, returns, and expenses. Using quarterly return data for 225 pension funds comprising 68% of total prudentially regulated pension fund assets, we find significant differences exist across fund types. On both a net return and risk-adjusted performance basis, not-for-profit funds significantly outperformed for-profit funds over the seven years to June 2002. We suggest that the performance difference is consistent with the hypothesis that agency costs in for-profit funds (due to non-representative trustee board structures and potential board member conflicts of interest) are greater than agency costs in not-for-profit funds (with representative trustee boards).

Suggested Citation

  • Coleman, Anthony D. F. & Esho, Neil & Wong, Michelle, 2006. "The impact of agency costs on the investment performance of Australian pension funds," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(3), pages 299-324, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:jpenef:v:5:y:2006:i:03:p:299-324_00
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:thr:techub:1009:y:2020:i:1:p:384-396 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Sy, Wilson, 2010. "Cost, performance and portfolio composition of small pension funds in Australia," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(3), pages 345-368, July.
    3. Wilson Sy, 2009. "Towards a national default option for low‐cost superannuation," Accounting Research Journal, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 22(1), pages 46-67, July.
    4. Saleh F.A. Khatib & Dewi Fariha Abdullah & Ali Shariff Kabara & Saddam A. Hazaea & Tamil Selvi Rajoo, 2020. "Does Debts have any Impact on Governance Bundle and Agency Costs? Over-Governance Hypothesis," Technium Social Sciences Journal, Technium Science, vol. 9(1), pages 384-396, July.
    5. Monica GS Tan & Marie-Anne Cam, 2015. "Does governance structure influence pension fund fees and costs? An examination of Australian not-for-profit superannuation funds," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 40(1), pages 114-134, February.
    6. Adam Butt & M. Scott Donald & F. Douglas Foster & Susan Thorp & Geoffrey J. Warren & Tom Smith, 2017. "Design of MySuper default funds: influences and outcomes," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 57(1), pages 47-85, March.
    7. Geoffrey Kingston & Susan Thorp, 2019. "Superannuation in Australia: A Survey of the Literature," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 95(308), pages 141-160, March.
    8. Jeremy Burke & Angela A. Hung & Jack Clift & Steven Garber & Joanne K. Yoong, 2015. "Impacts of Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry," Working Papers WR-1076, RAND Corporation.
    9. Isabel Abinzano & Luis Muga & Rafael Santamaria, 2016. "The Role of Investor Type in the Fee Structures of Pension Plans," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 50(3), pages 387-417, December.
    10. Karen Benson & Marion Hutchinson & Ashwin Sriram, 2011. "Governance in the Australian Superannuation Industry," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 99(2), pages 183-200, March.

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