Do voters dislike liberalizing reforms? New evidence using data on satisfaction with democracy
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Other versions of this item:
- Berggren, Niclas & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2018. "Do Voters Dislike Liberalizing Reforms? New Evidence Using Data on Satisfaction with Democracy," Working Paper Series 1197, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
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Cited by:
- Berggren, Niclas & Nilsson, Therese, 2021.
"Economic freedom and antisemitism,"
Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 289-304, April.
- Berggren, Niclas & Nilsson, Therese, 2020. "Economic Freedom and Antisemitism," Working Paper Series 1357, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Méon, Pierre-Guillaume & Sekkat, Khalid, 2022.
"A time to throw stones, a time to reap: how long does it take for democratic transitions to improve institutional outcomes?,"
Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(3), pages 429-443, June.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, 2016. "A time to throw stones, a time to reap: How long does it take for democratic transitions to improve institutional outcomes?," Working Papers CEB 16-016, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, 2021. "A time to throw stones, a time to reap: How long does it take for democratic transitions to improve institutional outcomes?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/328681, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Bennett, Daniel L. & Long, Jason T., 2019. "Is it the economic policy, stupid? Economic policy, political parties & the gubernatorial incumbent advantage," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 118-137.
- Ryan H. Murphy, 2019. "The long‐run effect of government ideology on economic freedom," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 101-114, February.
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- P11 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Planning, Coordination, and Reform
- Z18 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Public Policy
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