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Who are the owners of the firm: shareholders, employees or no one?

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  • CHASSAGNON, VIRGILE
  • HOLLANDTS, XAVIER

Abstract

The issue of firm ownership is an ongoing debate. For several decades, contractarian theory has undoubtedly shaped the academic debate in both law and economics. Proponents of this approach suggest that shareholders can legitimately be considered the owners of a firm because they hold shares. This approach, though attractive, is legally incorrect. Legal scholars have noted that a corporation cannot legally belong to shareholders or other stakeholders; no one owns the firm (and a corporation). The question of firm ownership masks the following crucial issue: Who should govern the firm? In this article, after returning to the theoretical debate on firm ownership and explaining why a firm cannot be owned, we shall analyze power as the core of firm governance. This approach is a potentially relevant and accurate way to address the problems of specific human investment, collective creation and productive (consummate) cooperation in modern firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Chassagnon, Virgile & Hollandts, Xavier, 2014. "Who are the owners of the firm: shareholders, employees or no one?," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 47-69, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jinsec:v:10:y:2014:i:01:p:47-69_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Charis Michael Vlados & Fotios Katimertzopoulos & Ioannis Blatsos, 2018. "Innovation in Stra. Tech. Man (Strategy-Technology-Management) Terms," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Business Innovation, Macrothink Institute, Journal of Entrepreneurship and Business Innovation, vol. 5(2), pages 1-1, December.
    2. Nicolas Aubert & Solange Hernandez & Xavier Hollandts, 2017. "De la participation des salariés à l'épargne salariale : analyse lexicale des débats parlementaires," Post-Print halshs-01401959, HAL.
    3. Pierre-Louis Choquet, 2019. "Piercing the corporate veil: Towards a better assessment of the position of transnational oil and gas companies in the global carbon budget," Post-Print hal-04401241, HAL.
    4. Lagoarde-Segot, Thomas & Paranque, Bernard, 2018. "Finance and sustainability: From ideology to utopia," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 80-92.
    5. FitzRoy, Felix & Nolan, Michael A., 2020. "Towards Economic Democracy and Social Justice: Profit Sharing, Co-Determination, and Employee Ownership," IZA Discussion Papers 13238, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Schneider, Nathan, 2020. "Mediated Ownership: Capital as Media," MediArXiv np325, Center for Open Science.
    7. Hervé Charmettant & Yvan Renou, 2021. "Cooperative conversion and communalization: Closely observed interactions between the material and the mental," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 92(1), pages 55-77, March.
    8. Chassagnon, Virgile, 2013. "Contrôle et manipulation au cœur de la firme-monde ?," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 14.
    9. Kévin Pastier & François Silva, 2020. "Objet, raison d’être et praxis : les coopératives et le commun au secours de l’entreprise ?," Post-Print hal-02872799, HAL.
    10. Bernard PARANQUE, 2018. "Finance as a “commons” understood as ideal-type for emancipation," CIRIEC Studies Series, in: Philippe BANCE & CIRIEC (ed.), Providing public goods and commons. Towards coproduction and new forms of governance for a revival of public action, volume 1, chapter 7, pages 135-160, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.
    11. Xavier Hollandts & Bertrand Valiorgue, 2019. "La gouvernance de médiation comme réponse aux impasses conceptuelles et pratiques de la gouvernance actionnariale," Post-Print hal-03041045, HAL.
    12. Michael I.C. Nwogugu, 2019. "Complex Systems, Multi-Sided Incentives and Risk Perception in Companies," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-137-44704-3, December.

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