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Can More Be Less? An Experimental Test of the Resource Curse

Author

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  • Al-Ubaydli, Omar
  • McCabe, Kevin
  • Twieg, Peter

Abstract

Several scholars have argued that abundant natural resources can be harmful to economic performance under bad institutions and helpful when institutions are good. These arguments have either been theoretical or based on naturally occurring variation in natural resource wealth. We test this theory by using a laboratory experiment to reap the benefits of randomized control. We conduct this experiment in a virtual world (Second Life™) to make institutions more visceral. We find support for the theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Al-Ubaydli, Omar & McCabe, Kevin & Twieg, Peter, 2014. "Can More Be Less? An Experimental Test of the Resource Curse," Journal of Experimental Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 39-58, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:jexpos:v:1:y:2014:i:01:p:39-58_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Haruvy, Ernan & Li, Sherry Xin & McCabe, Kevin & Twieg, Peter, 2017. "Communication and visibility in public goods provision," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 276-296.
    2. Innocenti, Alessandro, 2017. "Virtual reality experiments in economics," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 71-77.
    3. Yoshio Iida, 2021. "Communication, choice continuity, and player number in a continuous-time public goods experiment," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 16(4), pages 955-988, October.
    4. Andreas Leibbrandt & John Lynham, 2018. "Does the paradox of plenty exist? Experimental evidence on the curse of resource abundance," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(2), pages 337-354, June.
    5. Abatayo, Anna Lou & Lynham, John, 2023. "Resource booms and group punishment in a coupled social-ecological system," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts

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