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Take the Money and Run: The Determinants of Compliance with Aid Agreements

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  • Girod, Desha M.
  • Tobin, Jennifer L.

Abstract

Conditions on aid agreements aim to increase aid effectiveness, and are, therefore, an important component of aid agreements. Yet little is known about why aid-recipient governments comply with these conditions. Some scholars have suggested a strategic-importance hypothesis: recipients comply when donors enforce conditions—and donors enforce conditions when recipients are not strategically important. However, there are many cases where strategically important countries comply with conditions and strategically unimportant countries fail to do so. We argue that to explain compliance, we must also understand how the desire to maximize revenue from major income sources, such as FDI and natural resource rents, changes the recipient's incentive to comply. Using data on World Bank records of compliance from 1964 to 2010, we find strong support for our hypotheses even after accounting for different model specifications and potential endogeneity. Paradoxically, donors can secure compliance from recipients for reasons unrelated to the promise of additional aid.

Suggested Citation

  • Girod, Desha M. & Tobin, Jennifer L., 2016. "Take the Money and Run: The Determinants of Compliance with Aid Agreements," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 70(1), pages 209-239, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:70:y:2016:i:01:p:209-239_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Mirko Heinzel & Andrea Liese, 2021. "Managing performance and winning trust: how World Bank staff shape recipient performance," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 625-653, July.
    2. Mitchell Watkins, 2022. "Undermining conditionality? The effect of Chinese development assistance on compliance with World Bank project agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 667-690, October.
    3. Knack,Stephen & Parks,Bradley Christopher & Harutyunyan,Ani & DiLorenzo,Matthew, 2020. "How Does the World Bank Influence the Development Policy Priorities of Low-Income and Lower-Middle Income Countries ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9225, The World Bank.
    4. McLean, Elena V., 2023. "Looking for advice: The politics of consulting services procurement in the World Bank," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 161(C).
    5. Mirko Heinzel, 2023. "Vytautas Jankauskas and Steffen Eckhard. 2023. The Politics of Evaluation in International Organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press)," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 777-781, October.
    6. Takaaki Masaki & Bradley C. Parks, 2020. "When do performance assessments influence policy behavior? Micro-evidence from the 2014 Reform Efforts Survey," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 371-408, April.
    7. Desha M Girod & Megan A Stewart & Meir R Walters, 2018. "Mass protests and the resource curse: The politics of demobilization in rentier autocracies," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 35(5), pages 503-522, September.
    8. Michael A. Bailey & Erik Voeten, 2018. "A two-dimensional analysis of seventy years of United Nations voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 176(1), pages 33-55, July.

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