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Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the European Union

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  • Dorussen, Han
  • Kirchner, Emil J.
  • Sperling, James

Abstract

This article compares European Union (EU) burden-sharing in security governance distinguishing between assurance, prevention, protection, and compellence policies. We employ joint-product models and examine the variation in the level of publicness, the asymmetry of the distribution of costs and benefits, and aggregation technologies in each policy domain. Joint-product models predict equal burden-sharing for protection and assurance because of their respective weakest-link and summation aggregation technologies with symmetric costs. Prevention is also characterized by the technology of summation, but asymmetry of costs implies uneven burden-sharing. Uneven burden-sharing is predicted for compellence because it has the largest asymmetry of costs and a best-shot aggregation technology. Evaluating burden-sharing relative to a country's ability to contribute, Kendall tau-tests examine the rank-correlation between security burden and the capacity of EU member states. These tests show that the smaller EU members disproportionately shoulder the costs of assurance and protection; wealthier EU members carry a somewhat disproportionate burden in the provision of prevention, and larger EU members in the provision of compellence. When analyzing contributions relative to expected benefits, asymmetric marginal costs can largely explain uneven burden-sharing. The main conclusion is that the aggregated burden of collective security governance in the EU is shared quite evenly.

Suggested Citation

  • Dorussen, Han & Kirchner, Emil J. & Sperling, James, 2009. "Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the European Union," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(4), pages 789-810, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:intorg:v:63:y:2009:i:04:p:789-810_99
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    Cited by:

    1. Adam Rose & Tyler Kustra, 2013. "Economic Considerations in Designing Emergency Management Institutions and Policies for Transboundary Disasters," Public Management Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(3), pages 446-462, March.
    2. Marios Efthymiopoulos, 2011. "The Economic Knowledge and NATO’s Financial Visibility," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 2(2), pages 249-255, June.
    3. Emil J. Kirchner, 2014. "Theoretical Debates on Regional Security Governance," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers p0379, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
    4. Raphael Bossong, 2011. "Public Good Theory and the 'Added Value' of the EU's Counterterrorism Policy," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 42, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Anessa L. Kimball, 2019. "Knocking NATO: Strategic and institutional challenges risk the future of Europe’s seven-decade long cold peace," SPP Briefing Papers, The School of Public Policy, University of Calgary, vol. 12(36), October.
    6. Benjamin Zyla, 2018. "Beyond the 2% fetishism: studying the practice of collective action in transatlantic affairs," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 4(1), pages 1-11, December.
    7. Emil J. Kirchner, 2014. "Theoretical Debates on Regional Security Governance," RSCAS Working Papers 2014/40, European University Institute.
    8. Stéphanie C. Hofmann, 2011. "Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(1), pages 101-120, January.

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