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The Italian Corporate Network After the “Golden Age†(1972–1983): From Centrality to Marginalization of State-Owned Enterprises

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  • Rinaldi, Alberto
  • Vasta, Michelangelo

Abstract

This article analyzes the structure of the Italian corporate network in the decade that followed the end of the “Golden Age†(1972–83), when the transition from the technological trajectory of the second to that of the third industrial revolution began. The article is based on a large dataset, Imita.db, which contains data on more than thirty-eight thousand Italian joint-stock companies and about three hundred thousand directors, and uses both network analysis and a prosopographic approach. The main result is that the interval considered was marked by a sharp decrease in the degree of cohesion of the Italian corporate network. In 1972, the system was very cohesive and state-owned enterprises were well represented within the most central firms. In 1983, the cohesion of the system had sharply diminished; state-owned enterprises had disappeared from the center and a new private center, hinged on Mediobanca, the only merchant bank operating in the country, had emerged.

Suggested Citation

  • Rinaldi, Alberto & Vasta, Michelangelo, 2012. "The Italian Corporate Network After the “Golden Age†(1972–1983): From Centrality to Marginalization of State-Owned Enterprises," Enterprise & Society, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 378-413, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:entsoc:v:13:y:2012:i:02:p:378-413_01
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gualdani, Cristina, 2021. "An econometric model of network formation with an application to board interlocks between firms," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 224(2), pages 345-370.
    2. Marco Simoni, 2019. "Institutional Roots of Economic Decline: Lessons from Italy," LEQS – LSE 'Europe in Question' Discussion Paper Series 143, European Institute, LSE.
    3. Leonardo Bargigli & Renato Giannetti, 2015. "The Italian Corporate System: SOEs, Private Firms and Institutions in a Network Perspective (1952-1983)," Working Papers - Economics wp2015_01.rdf, Universita' degli Studi di Firenze, Dipartimento di Scienze per l'Economia e l'Impresa.
    4. repec:fan:istois:v:html10.3280/isto2021-043005 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Emanuele Felice & Giovanni Vecchi, 2013. "Italy’s Growth and Decline, 1861-2011," CEIS Research Paper 293, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 11 Oct 2013.
    6. Lucrezia Fattobene & Marco Caiffa & Emiliano Di Carlo, 2018. "Interlocking directorship across Italian listed companies: evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 22(2), pages 393-425, June.
    7. François, Pierre & Lemercier, Claire, 2014. "State or status capitalism? Some insights on french idiosyncrasis using an interlocking directorates approach," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 15(2), pages 17-33.
    8. Bargigli, L. & Giannetti, R., 2018. "The Italian corporate system in a network perspective (1952–1983)," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 494(C), pages 367-379.
    9. Michelangelo Vasta & Carlo Drago & Roberto Ricciuti & Alberto Rinaldi, 2017. "Reassessing the bank–industry relationship in Italy, 1913–1936: a counterfactual analysis," Cliometrica, Springer;Cliometric Society (Association Francaise de Cliométrie), vol. 11(2), pages 183-216, May.
    10. Cristina Gualdani, 2021. "An Econometric Model of Network Formation with an Application to Board Interlocks between Firms," Post-Print hal-03548907, HAL.

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