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Lobbying and the collective action problem: comparative evidence from enterprise surveys

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  • Barber, Benjamin
  • Pierskalla, Jan
  • Weschle, Simon

Abstract

Industry lobbying is traditionally thought of as a non-excludable good subject to collective action problems that are most easily solved by concentrated industries. However, there is very little empirical support for this hypothesis. In this paper, we address a major shortcoming of existing work on the topic: Its near-exclusive reliance on data from the US. Using comparative firm-level survey data from up to 74 countries, we construct an industry-level indicator of concentration and test its effect on firms’ lobbying activity. Using multilevel Extreme Bounds Analysis and Bayesian Variable Selection techniques to account for model uncertainty, we find no evidence that industry concentration is a predictor of lobbying activity. We discuss the implications of these non-findings for the literature and outline possible avenues for further research.

Suggested Citation

  • Barber, Benjamin & Pierskalla, Jan & Weschle, Simon, 2014. "Lobbying and the collective action problem: comparative evidence from enterprise surveys," Business and Politics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 221-246, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:buspol:v:16:y:2014:i:02:p:221-246_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Kanol Direnç, 2015. "Social influence, competition and the act of lobbying," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(1), pages 75-96, April.
    2. Govorun Andrei & Pyle William & Marques II Israel, 2016. "The political roots of intermediated lobbying: evidence from Russian enterprises and business associations," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 18(4), pages 395-433, December.
    3. Michael Rochlitz, 2016. "Collective Action Abroad: How Foreign Investors Organize Evidence from Foreign Business Associations In the Russian Federation," HSE Working papers WP BRP 32/PS/2016, National Research University Higher School of Economics.

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