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Contingent Prize Allocation and Pivotal Voting

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  • Smith, Alastair
  • Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce

Abstract

Parties can elitcit widespread electoral support by making the distribution of prizes or rewards to groups of voters contingent upon electoral support. In addition to altering which party wins, a voter's choice also influences the distribution of prizes. This latter factor, referred to in this article as prize pivotalness, tends to be the dominant influence in vote choice. The desire to win prizes can induce voters to coalesce into a highly supportive group, even if they dislike the party's policies. Characterizing voting equilibria in this framework explains the rationale for the support of patronage parties, variance in voter turnout and the endogenous political polarization of groups in both established and new democracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Smith, Alastair & Bueno De Mesquita, Bruce, 2012. "Contingent Prize Allocation and Pivotal Voting," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 371-392, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:bjposi:v:42:y:2012:i:02:p:371-392_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Miguel R Rueda, 2015. "Buying votes with imperfect local knowledge and a secret ballot," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(3), pages 428-456, July.
    2. Charles Louis-Sidois, 2018. "Three Essays in Political Economy [Trois essais en économie politique]," SciencePo Working papers tel-03457852, HAL.
    3. Alastair Smith & Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Tom LaGatta, 2017. "Group incentives and rational voting1," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 29(2), pages 299-326, April.
    4. Charles Louis-Sidois, 2018. "Trois essais en économie politique," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/bpfbvips89e, Sciences Po.
    5. Andersen, Jørgen Juel & Fiva, Jon H. & Natvik, Gisle James, 2014. "Voting when the stakes are high," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C), pages 157-166.
    6. Alastair Smith & Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, 2019. "Motivating political support with group-based rewards," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(2), pages 156-182, April.
    7. Jorge Gallego, 2015. "Natural Disasters and Clientelism: the Case of Floods and Landslides in Colombia," Documentos de Trabajo 12537, Universidad del Rosario.
    8. Charles Louis-Sidois, 2018. "Three essays in political economy [Trois essais en économie politique]," SciencePo Working papers tel-03419395, HAL.
    9. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/bpfbvips89ef8bnmu88napd8r is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Charles Louis-Sidois, 2018. "Three essays in political economy [Trois essais en économie politique]," SciencePo Working papers Main tel-03419395, HAL.

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