IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cup/apsrev/v90y1996i03p555-566_20.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Dynamics of Cosponsorship

Author

Listed:
  • Kessler, Daniel
  • Krehbiel, Keith

Abstract

Electoral-connection theories of legislative politics view bill cosponsorship as low-cost position taking by rational legislators who communicate with target audiences (e.g., constituents) external to the legislature. Legislative signaling games suggest a view of bill cosponsorship in which early cosponsors attempt to communicate to target audiences (e.g., the median voter) within the legislature. Using data from the 103rd U.S. House of Representatives, we show that the timing of legislators' cosponsorship decisions are more supportive of cosponsorship as intralegislative signaling than as extralegislative position taking. First, policy extremists on both sides of the political spectrum are more likely than moderates to be initial endorsers of legislative initiatives. Second, extremist-moderate differences diminish over the course of bill histories.

Suggested Citation

  • Kessler, Daniel & Krehbiel, Keith, 1996. "Dynamics of Cosponsorship," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 90(3), pages 555-566, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:03:p:555-566_20
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/product/identifier/S0003055400207144/type/journal_article
    File Function: link to article abstract page
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Shaun M. Tanger & Richard Alan Seals Jr. & David N. Laband, 2011. "Does Bill Co-sponsorship Affect Campaign Contributions?: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives, 2000-2008," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2011-09, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
    2. Desmarais, B.A. & Cranmer, S.J., 2012. "Statistical mechanics of networks: Estimation and uncertainty," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 391(4), pages 1865-1876.
    3. Tanger, Shaun M. & Laband, David N., 2009. "An empirical analysis of bill co-sponsorship in the U.S. Senate: The Tree Act of 2007," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 260-265, July.
    4. Jillian D. Chown & Christopher C. Liu, 2015. "Geography and power in an organizational forum: Evidence from the U.S. Senate Chamber," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 177-196, February.
    5. Neal, Zachary & Domagalski, Rachel & Yan, Xiaoqin, 2020. "Party Control as a Context for Homophily in Collaborations among US House Representatives, 1981 -- 2015," OSF Preprints qwdxs, Center for Open Science.
    6. David Laband & Richard Seals & Eric Wilbrandt, 2015. "On the importance of inequality in politics: duplicate bills and bill co-sponsorship in the US House of Representatives," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 353-378, November.
    7. Zhang, Daowei & Tanger, Shaun, 2017. "Is there a connection between campaign contributions and legislative commitment? An empirical analysis on the cosponsorship activity of the 2007 Tree Act," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 85(P1), pages 85-94.
    8. Franklin G. Mixon & Rand W. Ressler & M. Troy Gibson, 2003. "Congressional Memberships as Political Advertising: Evidence from the U.S. Senate," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 70(2), pages 414-424, October.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:90:y:1996:i:03:p:555-566_20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kirk Stebbing (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cambridge.org/psr .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.