IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cpp/issued/v24y1998i3p381-387.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economics versus Politics in Canadian Payroll Tax Policies

Author

Listed:
  • Jonathan R. Kesselman

Abstract

In recent years the federal government has increased its reliance on payroll taxes. This approach is revealed most directly in Employment Insurance premiums but also emerges in planned increases for Canada Pension Plan premiums. Economic criteria support these moves to the extent that premiums are strongly linked to benefit entitlements. However, much of the EI and increased CPP premiums are unrelated to benefits and thus constitute general payroll taxes. Such taxes compare favourably in economic terms with some alternative taxes but are regressive when imposed with a ceiling on taxable earnings. These developments appear to be driven by political pressures rather than economic criteria. If the government is politically constrained from raising the rates of other, more visible taxes (such as income tax and GST), then the payroll tax changes may be economically optimal choices subject to the constraint. In the longer run, basic reform of the other taxes and reduced reliance on general payroll taxes would be desirable.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan R. Kesselman, 1998. "Economics versus Politics in Canadian Payroll Tax Policies," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 24(3), pages 381-387, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:24:y:1998:i:3:p:381-387
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0317-0861%28199809%2924%3A3%3C381%3AEVPICP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D
    Download Restriction: only available to JSTOR subscribers
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. D. Peter Dungan, 1998. "The CPP Payroll Tax Hike: Macroeconomic Transition Costs and Alternatives," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 24(3), pages 394-401, September.
    2. Hettich, Walter & Winer, Stanley L, 1988. "Economic and Political Foundations of Tax Structure," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 701-712, September.
    3. Stuart Landon & David L. Ryan, 1997. "The Political Costs of Taxes and Government Spending," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(1), pages 85-111, February.
    4. Louis Beauséjour & Munir A. Sheikh & Baxter Williams, 1998. "Experience Rating Employment Insurance Contributions," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 24(3), pages 388-393, September.
    5. Dungan, P., 1998. "The CPP Payroll Tax Hike: Macroeconomic Transition Costs and Alternatives," Papers 98-2, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jack M. Mintz & Thomas A. Wilson, 2001. "Taxes, Efficiency and Economic Growth," The State of Economics in Canada: Festschrift in Honour of David Slater, in: Patrick Grady & Andrew Sharpe (ed.),The State of Economics in Canada: Festschrift in Honour of David Slater, pages 95-133, Centre for the Study of Living Standards.
    2. Bharatee Dash & Angara Raja, 2014. "Do political determinants affect revenue collection? Evidence from the Indian states," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 61(3), pages 253-278, September.
    3. Benny Geys & Jan Vermeir, 2008. "Taxation and presidential approval: separate effects from tax burden and tax structure turbulence?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 301-317, June.
    4. Tidiane Ly, 2018. "Sub-metropolitan tax competition with household and capital mobility," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 25(5), pages 1129-1169, October.
    5. Leers, T. & Meijdam, A.C. & Verbon, H.A.A., 2001. "The Politics of Pension Reform Under Population Ageing," Other publications TiSEM bb03e411-061a-48e2-8a63-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Sutirtha Bagchi & Libor Dušek, 2023. "Tax Withholding and the Size of Government," Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series 59, Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics.
    7. Stanley L. Winer & George Tridimas & Walter Hettich, 2007. "Social Welfare and Collective Goods Coercion in Public Economics," Carleton Economic Papers 07-03, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
    8. Aidt, T.S. & Eterovic, D.S., 2007. "Give and Take: Political Competition, Participation and Public Finance in 20th Century Latin America," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0714, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    9. Haizhen Mou, 2012. "The political economy of public health expenditure and wait times in a public‐private mixed health care system," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 45(4), pages 1640-1666, November.
    10. Goodspeed, Timothy J., 2002. "Tax competition and tax structure in open federal economies: Evidence from OECD countries with implications for the European Union," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 357-374, February.
    11. Bazart, C., 2001. "La complexité du processus institutionnel de décision fiscale : causes et conséquences," Cahiers du CREDEN (CREDEN Working Papers) 01.06.23, CREDEN (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Droit de l'Energie), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.
    12. Stijn Goeminne & Benny Geys & Carine Smolders, 2008. "Political fragmentation and projected tax revenues: evidence from Flemish municipalities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 15(3), pages 297-315, June.
    13. Michael A. Nelson, 2000. "Electoral Cycles and the Politics of State Tax Policy," Public Finance Review, , vol. 28(6), pages 540-560, November.
    14. Lucy F. Ackert & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Mark Rider, 2004. "Tax policy design in the presence of social preferences: some experimental evidence," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2004-33, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    15. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2007:i:4:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Volkerink, Bjørn & Haan, Jakob de, 1999. "Political and institutional determinants of the tax mix : an empirical investigation for OECD countries," Research Report 99E05, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
    17. Federico Revelli, 2013. "Tax Mix Corners and Other Kinks," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(3), pages 741-776.
    18. Islam, Md. Rabiul & Madsen, Jakob B. & Doucouliagos, Hristos, 2018. "Does inequality constrain the power to tax? Evidence from the OECD," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 1-17.
    19. Dalibor Eterovic & Nicolas Eterovic, 2010. "Political Competition vs. PoliticalParticipation: Effects on Government's Size," Working Papers wp_006, Adolfo Ibáñez University, School of Government.
    20. Inman, Robert P. & Rubinfeld, Daniel L., 1996. "Designing tax policy in federalist economies: An overview," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 307-334, June.
    21. Forest, Adam & Sheffrin, Steven M., 2002. "Complexity and Compliance: An Empirical Investigation," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 55(N. 1), pages 75-88, March.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpp:issued:v:24:y:1998:i:3:p:381-387. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Iver Chong (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.utpjournals.press/loi/cpp .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.