Quality control mechanisms under capitation payment for medical services
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- Eugenia Amporfu, 2013. "Effect of regulated user fee on quality of healthcare for the poor and the non-poor," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 60(4), pages 357-373, December.
- Blomqvist, Ake & Leger, Pierre Thomas, 2005.
"Information asymmetry, insurance, and the decision to hospitalize,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 775-793, July.
- Åke Blomqvist & Pierre Thomas Léger, 2001. "Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and the Decision to Hospitalize," Cahiers de recherche 01-03, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
- Åke Blomqvist & Pierre Thomas Léger, 2002. "Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and the Decision to Hospitalize," CIRANO Working Papers 2002s-06, CIRANO.
- Åke Blomqvist & Pierre Thomas Léger, 2003. "Information Asymmetry, Insurance, and the Decision to Hospitalize," Departmental Working Papers wp0305, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
- Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Discussion Paper Series dp472, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- R. Amy Puenpatom & Robert Rosenman, 2006. "Efficiency of Thai provincial public hospitals after the introduction of National Health Insurance Program," Working Papers 2006-2, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
- Daniel Montanera, 2016. "The importance of negative defensive medicine in the effects of malpractice reform," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 17(3), pages 355-369, April.
- Ehud Guttel & Barak Medina, 2007. "Less Crime, More (Vulnerable) Victims: Game Theory and the Distributional Effects of Criminal Sanctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001799, UCLA Department of Economics.
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