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Export market correlation and strategic trade policy

Author

Listed:
  • Mahmudul Anam
  • Shin-Hwan Chiang

Abstract

In the traditional models of strategic trade policy pioneered by Brander and Spencer, exports of the domestic firm, engaged in a Cournot-Nash competition with the foreign firm in a neutral market, must be subsidized to maximize national welfare. We demonstrate that when the firms play the Cournot-Nash game in two stochastic and positively correlated markets, it may be optimal to tax exports to the more volatile market while subsidizing it in the other. The policy combination reduces the amplitude of aggregate profit and raises the utility of the risk-averse firm in a manner similar to the theory of portfolio choice.

Suggested Citation

  • Mahmudul Anam & Shin-Hwan Chiang, 2000. "Export market correlation and strategic trade policy," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(1), pages 41-52, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:33:y:2000:i:1:p:41-52
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Anam, Mahmudul & Chiang, Shin-Hwan, 2006. "Price discrimination and social welfare with correlated demand," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 110-122, September.
    2. Brown, Murray & Chiang, Shin-Hwan, 2002. "Unsystematic risk and coalition formation in product markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 313-338, March.
    3. Ning, Haokai, 2020. "Choice of Trade Policy with Incomplete Information," MPRA Paper 101529, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Yoshino, Hisao, 2011. "Strategic trade policy and non-linear subsidy : in the case of price competition," IDE Discussion Papers 287, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection

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