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Répression du stationnement frauduleux et congestion routière urbaine. Une approche théorique

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  • Romain Petiot

Abstract

The article deals with a non-free parking violation economic analysis. Based on a parking behavior model, the analysis rests on the economics of crime principles. The results show that the choice of the fine level has an impact both on the travel demand and on the modal share. In particular in the case of hypercongestion, the increase in the fine brings the risk-neutral user an advantage of driving and breaking the parking law. This result leads to reject the consensual policy, which prescribes the systematic increase in the fine to deter the parking meter non-compliance within the framework of the travel calming policy. Those results are confirmed by the numerical simulations. Classification JEL : R48, K42.

Suggested Citation

  • Romain Petiot, 2002. "Répression du stationnement frauduleux et congestion routière urbaine. Une approche théorique," Revue d'économie régionale et urbaine, Armand Colin, vol. 0(2), pages 275-298.
    • Handle: RePEc:cai:rerarc:reru_022_0275
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Romain Petiot, 2004. "Parking enforcement and travel demand management," Post-Print hal-02422664, HAL.
    2. Romain Petiot, 2002. "Faut-il renforcer la répression du stationnement frauduleux ?," Post-Print halshs-01401487, HAL.
    3. Petiot, Romain, 2004. "Parking enforcement and travel demand management," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 399-411, October.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    public economics; transport economics; congestion; pricing; economics of crime; illegal behavior;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • R48 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Transportation Economics - - - Government Pricing and Policy
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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