IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/cai/recosp/reco_586_1247.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Analyse économique du marché du logement locatif

Author

Listed:
  • Étienne Wasmer

Abstract

Housing is fully an economic good. Demand and supply factors play first order roles on prices and quantity exchanged. It is also a heavily regulated market. The law, in particular in France, is complex, its execution described by the « Code de procédure civile » is even more complex. In this text, we focus on the rental housing market and attempt to rationalize the existence of such regulations by various market imperfections. In a first part, we describe the lenght of litigation procedures between landlords and tenants. In a second part, we study the consequences of such delays under adverse selection: landlords attempt to screen tenants according to their (exogenous) propensity to sustain the rent. In a third part, we consider moral hazard issues, whereby tenants undertake actions affecting their likelihood of defecting on the rent. We conclude on the need for economists to consider asymmetries of information in urban economics and for law scholars willing to defend the Civil Code of French origine, to investigate where economic inefficiencies lie in order to keep its initial spirit. Classification JEL : R52, K41

Suggested Citation

  • Étienne Wasmer, 2007. "Analyse économique du marché du logement locatif," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 58(6), pages 1247-1264.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_586_1247
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/load_pdf.php?ID_ARTICLE=RECO_586_1247
    Download Restriction: free

    File URL: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique-2007-6-page-1247.htm
    Download Restriction: free

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2012. "Do remedies affect the efficiency defense? An optimal merger-control analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 58-66.
    2. Johnson, Ronald N & Parkman, Allen M, 1991. "Premerger Notification and the Incentive to Merge and Litigate," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 145-162, Spring.
    3. Jo Seldeslachts & Joseph A. Clougherty & Pedro Pita Barros, 2009. "Settle for Now but Block for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(3), pages 607-634, August.
    4. Lars Sorgard & Andreea Cosnita-Langlais, 2013. "Enforcement vs Deterrence in Merger Control: Can Remedies Lead to Lower Welfare?," Post-Print hal-01668416, HAL.
    5. Tomaso Duso & Klaus Gugler & Florian Szücs, 2013. "An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(11), pages 596-619, November.
    6. Choe, Chongwoo & Shekhar, Chander, 2010. "Compulsory or voluntary pre-merger notification? Theory and some evidence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 10-20, January.
    7. Bruce R. Lyons, 2004. "Reform of European Merger Policy," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(2), pages 246-261, May.
    8. Eckbo, B Espen & Wier, Peggy, 1985. "Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: A Reexamination of the Market Power Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 119-149, April.
    9. Cosnita-Langlais, Andreea & Tropeano, Jean-Philippe, 2012. "Do remedies affect the efficiency defense? An optimal merger-control analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 58-66.
    10. William E. Kovacic & Petros C. Mavroidis & Damien J. Neven, 2014. "Merger control procedures and institutions: A comparison of the EU and US practice," IHEID Working Papers 01-2014, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Deffains Bruno & Roussey Ludivine, 2011. "The Multiplier Effect of Public Expenditure on Justice: The Case of Rental Litigation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 243-263, August.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R52 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_586_1247. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jean-Baptiste de Vathaire). General contact details of provider: http://www.cairn.info/revue-economique.htm .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.