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Élections et favoritisme dans l'attribution des marchés de services publics locaux

Author

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  • Christophe Gence-Creux

Abstract

Our study of sixty French municipalities shows that they have a tendency to concentrate the management of local public goods under a unique manager. This seems to go against the egalitarian and transparency principles of the European Union for attribution of markets. We show how ‘‘libre administration’’ and “intuitu personae” principles can lead a mayor, who has electoral concerns, to favor a unique manager even though this choice can in fact be inefficient. We also consider the natural limits to this behavior. Classification JEL : D44, D72, L41, L90.

Suggested Citation

  • Christophe Gence-Creux, 2001. "Élections et favoritisme dans l'attribution des marchés de services publics locaux," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 52(3), pages 753-763.
  • Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_523_0753
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    Cited by:

    1. Camille Guirou, 2016. "La carte cognitive négociée : un outil susceptible de rétablir la confiance dans les collectivités territoriales ?," Post-Print halshs-01449361, HAL.
    2. Desrieux, Claudine & Chong, Eshien & Saussier, Stéphane, 2013. "Putting all one's eggs in one basket: Relational contracts and the management of local public services," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 167-186.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L90 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - General

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