Élections et favoritisme dans l'attribution des marchés de services publics locaux
Our study of sixty French municipalities shows that they have a tendency to concentrate the management of local public goods under a unique manager. This seems to go against the egalitarian and transparency principles of the European Union for attribution of markets. We show how ??libre administration?? and ?intuitu personae?? principles can lead a mayor, who has electoral concerns, to favor a unique manager even though this choice can in fact be inefficient. We also consider the natural limits to this behavior. Classification JEL : D44, D72, L41, L90.
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