Strategic Responses: A Survey Experiment on Opposition to Pension Reforms
The responses given in opinion polls on future policy reforms reflect both subjective expectations and preferences. We disentangle these factors using data from a controlled survey experiment conducted in Germany. At the time of the experiment, an increased retirement age had been proposed as part of a pension reform. Thus, the survey respondents faced an incentive to give biased responses. By understating their expected work ability at the age of retirement, they could make the increase of the retirement age a less attractive policy option. We find evidence for such strategic response behavior, and this strategic bias appears to be stronger in former communist East Germany.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 115 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0347-0520|