Commercial Policy and Foreign Ownership
To serve the domestic market, foreign multinationals often not only export there but also control local firms through FDI. This paper examines the effects of trade and industrial policies on prices, outputs, profits, and welfare when exports and FDI coexist. Specifically, we focus on the case in which a foreign firm has full control of a local firm through partial ownership. Cross-border ownership on the basis of both financial interests and corporate control leads to horizontal market-linkages through which tariffs and production subsidies may harm a locally-owned firm but benefit a foreign firm. Foreign ownership regulation benefits a locally-owned firm.
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Volume (Year): 19 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (05)
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