Directed matching with endogenous Markov probability: clients or competitors?
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- Emanuela Ciapanna, 2008. "Directed Matching with Endogenous Markov Probability: Clients or Competitors?," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 665, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- L84 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Personal, Professional, and Business Services
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
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