IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/metroe/v58y2007i4p514-535.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Interest As An Artefact Of Self‐Validating Central Bank Beliefs

Author

Listed:
  • Tony Aspromourgos

Abstract

The classical/Sraffian approach to distribution is proposed as a more congenial framework for Keynes's concept of interest as a conventional variable—resulting from the interplay between central bank behaviour and financial market sentiment—because it provides a sounder basis for multiple interest rate equilibria. While either monetary policy or market expectations can be decisive, the capacity of policy to ensure markets acquiesce in the authorities' view remains at least as plausible as Keynes supposed. Interest is a result of ‘history’ plus the beliefs of the monetary authorities, where those beliefs may be illusory but nevertheless validated by actual outcomes.

Suggested Citation

  • Tony Aspromourgos, 2007. "Interest As An Artefact Of Self‐Validating Central Bank Beliefs," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 514-535, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:metroe:v:58:y:2007:i:4:p:514-535
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-999X.2007.00280.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999X.2007.00280.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1467-999X.2007.00280.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. William Poole, 1969. "Optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a simple stochastic macro model," Special Studies Papers 2, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Lavoie, Marc, 1996. "Horizontalism, Structuralism, Liquidity Preference and the Principle of Increasing Risk," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 43(3), pages 275-300, August.
    3. James Forder, 2001. "The Theory of Credibility and the Reputation-bias of Policy," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 5-25.
    4. Antonella Stirati, 2001. "Inflation, Unemployment and Hysteresis: An alternative view," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(4), pages 427-451.
    5. William Poole, 1970. "Optimal Choice of Monetary Policy Instruments in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(2), pages 197-216.
    6. Sergio Cesaratto & Franklin Serrano & Antonella Stirati, 2003. "Technical Change, Effective Demand and Employment," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(1), pages 33-52.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tony Aspromourgos, 2019. "The Past and Future of Keynesian Economics: A Review Essay," History of Economics Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 72(1), pages 59-78, January.
    2. Sheila Dow & Matthias Klaes & Alberto Montagnoli, 2009. "Risk And Uncertainty In Central Bank Signals: An Analysis Of Monetary Policy Committee Minutes," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 584-618, November.
    3. Guilherme Haluska & Julia Braga & Ricardo Summa, 2021. "Growth, investment share and the stability of the Sraffian Supermultiplier model in the U.S. economy (1985–2017)," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(2), pages 345-364, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Thomas I. Palley, 2013. "Horizontalists, verticalists, and structuralists: the theory of endogenous money reassessed," Review of Keynesian Economics, Edward Elgar Publishing, vol. 1(4), pages 406—424-4, OCT.
    2. Peter Docherty, 2012. "Keynes’s General Theory, the Quantity Theory of Money and Monetary Policy," Chapters, in: Thomas Cate (ed.), Keynes’s General Theory, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    3. Ireland, Peter N., 2003. "Endogenous money or sticky prices?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(8), pages 1623-1648, November.
    4. Rajesh Singh & Chetan Subramanian, 2008. "The optimal choice of monetary policy instruments in a small open economy," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 41(1), pages 105-137, February.
    5. Stanley Black, 1984. "The Relationship between Exchange Rate Policy and Monetary Policy in Ten Industrial Countries," NBER Chapters, in: Exchange Rate Theory and Practice, pages 499-516, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Richard A. Haas & Steven A. Symansky, 1983. "Assessing dynamic properties of the MCM: a simulation approach," International Finance Discussion Papers 214, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    7. Peter J. Stemp, 1991. "Optimal Weights in a Check‐List of Monetary Indicators," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 67(1), pages 1-13, March.
    8. -, 1992. "CEPAL Review no.48," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), December.
    9. Goodhart, C.A.E. & Sunirand, P. & Tsomocos, D.P., 2011. "The optimal monetary instrument for prudential purposes," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 70-77, June.
    10. Henri Sterdyniak & Pierre Villa, 1986. "Des conséquences conjoncturelles de la régulation monétaire," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 37(6), pages 963-998.
    11. Michael D. Bordo & John V. Duca, 2025. "Money Matters: Broad Divisia Money and the Recovery of the US Nominal GDP From the COVID‐19 Recession," Journal of Forecasting, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(3), pages 1071-1096, April.
    12. M. Marzo, 2001. "Evaluating Monetary Policy Regimes: the Role of Nominal Rigidities," Working Papers 411, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
    13. Jérôme Creel & Henri Sterdyniak, 1999. "La politique monétaire sans monnaie," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 70(1), pages 111-153.
    14. Andrej Sokol & Michael Kumhof & Marco Pinchetti & Phurichai Rungcharoenkitkul, 2023. "CBDC policies in open economies," BIS Working Papers 1086, Bank for International Settlements.
    15. Charles I. Plosser & George P. Shultz & John C. Williams, 2016. "Panel on Independence, Accountability, and Transparency in Central Bank Governance," Book Chapters,in: John H. Cochrane & John B. Taylor (ed.), Central Bank Governance & Oversight Reforminancial Crisis, chapter 6 Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
    16. Meixing Dai, 2010. "Implications de l’imperfection des marchés financiers pour la politique monétaire," Bulletin de l'Observatoire des politiques économiques en Europe, Observatoire des Politiques Économiques en Europe (OPEE), vol. 22(1), pages 28-35, June.
    17. C. A. E. Goodhart, 2009. "The Continuing Muddles of Monetary Theory: A Steadfast Refusal to Face Facts," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 76(s1), pages 821-830, October.
    18. Harris Dellas & George Tavlas, 2005. "Wage Rigidity and Monetary Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 907-927, October.
    19. Frauke Dobnik, 2011. "OLong-run Money Demand in OECD Countries – Cross-Member Cointegration," Ruhr Economic Papers 0237, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    20. Stefano Figuera, 2016. "Una nota sui contributi di Augusto Graziani e di Paolo Sylos Labini al dibattito sulla natura dell’offerta di moneta (What do we know about money in Italy, since 1861? Results from new time series)," Moneta e Credito, Economia civile, vol. 69(275), pages 317-347.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:metroe:v:58:y:2007:i:4:p:514-535. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0026-1386 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.