'Passauer Wahlborse': Information Processing in a Political Market Experiment
The authors present design and results of the 'Passauer Wahlborse,' a field experiment built on call market institution, which successfully predicted the outcome of the 1994 German Bundestag election. Building on theoretical and experimental literature, they discuss the determinants of individual trading behavior in a field environment and point at difficulties in analyzing the data generated by political market experiments. While previous explanations for the predictive success of these markets--i.e., the 'marginal trader hypothesis'--do not appear wholly convincing, the authors proffer an alternative that focuses on information costs and show that their findings are consistent with basic tenets from information economics. Copyright 1996 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 49 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0023-5962|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0023-5962|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:49:y:1996:i:2:p:171-204. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.