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On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure‐Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent‐Seeking Contests

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  • TAKESHI YAMAZAKI

Abstract

There can be three types of heterogeneity among players in a rent‐seeking contest. First, effectiveness of player's effort on the winning probabilities may differ among players. Secondly, players may evaluate the rent or prize of the rent‐seeking contest differently. Thirdly, players may face different financial constraints. This article proves under standard assumptions in the literature that there exists a unique pure‐strategy Nash equilibrium in a general asymmetric rent‐seeking contest with these three types of heterogeneity among players.

Suggested Citation

  • Takeshi Yamazaki, 2008. "On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure‐Strategy Nash Equilibrium in Asymmetric Rent‐Seeking Contests," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 10(2), pages 317-327, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:10:y:2008:i:2:p:317-327
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00364.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Christian Ewerhart & Federico Quartieri, 2020. "Unique equilibrium in contests with incomplete information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(1), pages 243-271, July.
    2. Aner Sela & Ezra Einy & 0ri Haimanko & Diego Moreno & Avishay Aiche & Benyamin Shitovitz, 2016. "Information Advantage in Common-Value Classic Tullock Contests," Working Papers 1614, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics.
    3. David Kelsey & Tigran Melkonyan, 2018. "Contests with ambiguity," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 1148-1169.
    4. Leyla D. Karakas, 2018. "Appeasement and compromise under a referendum threat," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 261-283, August.
    5. Chowdhury, Subhasish M. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2011. "Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(2), pages 216-219, August.
    6. Ezra Einy & Diego Moreno & Aner Sela, 2020. "Continuity and robustness of Bayesian equilibria in Tullock contests," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 8(2), pages 333-345, October.
    7. March, Christoph & Sahm, Marco, 2018. "Contests as selection mechanisms: The impact of risk aversion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 114-131.
    8. A. Aiche & E. Einy & O. Haimanko & D. Moreno & A. Sela & B. Shitovitz, 2019. "Information in Tullock contests," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 303-323, May.
    9. Andrea Gallice, 2014. "Rent-seeking contests with private valuations," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 390, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    10. Akio Matsumoto & Ferenc Szidarovszky, 2022. "Stability of dynamic asymmetric contests with endogenous prizes," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 17(1), pages 29-40, January.
    11. Einy, E & Haimanko, O & Moreno, D & Sela, A & Shitovitz, B, 2013. "Tullock Contests with Asymmetric Information," Discussion Papers 2013-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    12. Anders Gustafsson & Patrik Gustavsson Tingvall & Daniel Halvarsson, 2020. "Subsidy Entrepreneurs: an Inquiry into Firms Seeking Public Grants," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 439-478, September.
    13. Marco Sahm, 2010. "The Contest Winner: Gifted or Venturesome?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3285, CESifo.
    14. Koji Okuguchi & Takeshi Yamazaki, 2018. "Existence of Unique Equilibrium in Cournot Mixed Oligopoly," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 20(03), pages 1-13, September.
    15. Ratul Lahkar & Rezina Sultana, 2020. "Affirmative Action in Large Population Contests," Working Papers 40, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    16. Matros, Alexander, 2012. "Sad-Loser contests," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 155-162.
    17. Gallice, Andrea, 2017. "An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 256(2), pages 673-684.
    18. Xiuqin Yang & Feng Liu & Hua Wang, 2023. "Complex Dynamic Analysis for a Rent-Seeking Game with Political Competition and Policymaker Costs," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 11(21), pages 1-18, November.

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