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Structure, Capacity or Power? Explaining Salience in EU Decision-Making


  • Dirk Leuffen
  • Thomas Malang
  • Sebastian Wörle


Salience as the intensity of interest is a key explanatory factor of European Union decision-making. In this article, the ability of three explanatory models to explain the realized values of Member States’ salience is hypothesized and tested. On the basis of the DEU II data, the analysis shows that a mixture of national interest group heterogeneity and membership length has the highest predictive power. The results support the liberal intergovernmentalist claim that domestic interests determine European decision-making.

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  • Dirk Leuffen & Thomas Malang & Sebastian Wörle, 2014. "Structure, Capacity or Power? Explaining Salience in EU Decision-Making," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(3), pages 616-631, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:bla:jcmkts:v:52:y:2014:i:3:p:616-631

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. James P. Cross, 2012. "Interventions and negotiation in the Council of Ministers of the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(1), pages 47-69, March.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    3. Andrew Moravcsik, 1993. "Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(4), pages 473-524, December.
    4. Mahoney, Christine, 2007. "Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union," Journal of Public Policy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 27(01), pages 35-56, May.
    5. Gerald Schneider & Daniel Finke & Stefanie Bailer, 2010. "Bargaining Power in the European Union: An Evaluation of Competing Game-Theoretic Models," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 58, pages 85-103, February.
    6. Andreas Warntjen, 2012. "Measuring salience in EU legislative politics," European Union Politics, , vol. 13(1), pages 168-182, March.
    7. repec:cup:apsrev:v:95:y:2001:i:03:p:529-546_00 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. John Garry & James Tilley, 2009. "The Macroeconomic Factors Conditioning the Impact of Identity on Attitudes towards the EU," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(3), pages 361-379, September.
    9. repec:cup:apsrev:v:48:y:1954:i:03:p:787-792_00 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Iskander De Bruycker, 2016. "Pressure and Expertise: Explaining the Information Supply of Interest Groups in EU Legislative Lobbying," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(3), pages 599-616, May.
    2. Javier Arregui, 2016. "Determinants of Bargaining Satisfaction Across Policy Domains in the European Union Council of Ministers," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(5), pages 1105-1122, September.

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