How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company
The restructuring of a bankrupt company often entails the sale of such company. This paper suggests a way to sell the company that maximizes the creditorsâ€™ proceeds. The key to this proposal is the option left to the creditors to retain a fraction of the shares of the company. Indeed, by retaining the minority stake, creditors can transfer the control of the company while reducing to a minimum the rents that the sale of the company leaves in the hands of the buyer.
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Volume (Year): 12 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (06)
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