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Auctioning contracts for environmental services

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  • Peter Bardsley
  • Ingrid Burfurd

Abstract

Policy-based markets for environmental services include government procurement, private procurement to satisfy regulatory requirements and private procurement through government offset markets. These markets are increasingly popular and raise questions about optimal procurement under different regulatory frameworks. The design of these schemes draws together issues in auction design and contract theory. Using a mixed adverse selection, moral hazard model, we show that optimal contract design may differ significantly between procurement and regulatory policy environments. We model risk averse landholders to preserve a key feature of the policy environment. These findings have implications for the design of pollution reduction schemes and the rehabilitation of environmental assets.
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Suggested Citation

  • Peter Bardsley & Ingrid Burfurd, 2013. "Auctioning contracts for environmental services," Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, vol. 57(2), pages 253-272, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ajarec:v:57:y:2013:i:2:p:253-272
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8489.2012.00615.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Boxall, Peter C. & Perger, Orsolya & Packman, Katherine & Weber, Marian, 2017. "An experimental examination of target based conservation auctions," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 592-600.
    2. Erik Hofmann & Joël Henri Brunner & Elmar Holschbach, 2020. "Research in business service purchasing: current status and directions for the future," Management Review Quarterly, Springer, vol. 70(3), pages 421-460, August.
    3. Susan Stratton Sayre, 2019. "Pay for the Option to Pay? The Impact of Improved Scientific Information on Payments for Ecosystem Services," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(2), pages 591-625, June.
    4. Nordblom, T.L. & Hume, I.H. & Finlayson, J.D. & Pannell, D.J. & Holland, J.E. & McClintock, A.J., 2015. "Distributional consequences of upstream tree plantations on downstream water users in a Public–Private Benefit Framework," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 271-281.

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