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A brief survey on law and economics of contract law

Author

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  • Yusuf Sertaç Serter

    (School of Law, Anadolu University, Turkey)

Abstract

Right to own property and freedom of contract are two fundamental rights for the good of society. That’s to say – together with property law – contract law is vital for a good functioning economy. Thus, contract is a solid instrument to increase social welfare. Accordingly, a brief description of economic analysis of contract law will be carried out in this essay. As such, the author of the essay attempts to find appropriate answers to certain major questions including the following: Why are contracts good from a societal point of view? What types of risks can arise in a contract? What is a fully specified contract and how will risks be allocated in a fully specified contract? Why is a particular risk allocation in contracts important for both society and contracting parties? What are the consequences of transaction costs for contract law? What is the economic purpose of codification of default rules?

Suggested Citation

  • Yusuf Sertaç Serter, 2019. "A brief survey on law and economics of contract law," Juridical Tribune - Review of Comparative and International Law, Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 126-136, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:asr:journl:v:9:y:2019:i:1:p:126-136
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    File URL: http://www.tribunajuridica.eu/arhiva/An9v1/10.%20Y.%20Sertac%20Serter.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Harrington & John M. Vernon, 2005. "Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 4th Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 4, volume 1, number 026222075x, December.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    law and economics of contract law; fully specified contract; risk allocation; default rules.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K12 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Contract Law

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