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Meritocracy and Representation

Author

Listed:
  • Rajiv Sethi
  • Rohini Somanathan

Abstract

A standard conception of meritocracy, reflected in state referenda and the many legal filings against university admissions policies, is that selection rules should be blind to group identity and monotonic in measures of past accomplishment. We present theoretical arguments and survey empirical evidence challenging this view. Past accomplishment is often a garbled signal of multiple traits, some of which matter more for future performance than others. In such cases, group identity can be informative as a predictor of success and the increased representation of resource-disadvantaged groups could improve organizational performance. This perspective helps explain some recent empirical findings regarding the efficiency effects of group-contingent selection and moves us toward a conception of meritocracy more closely tied to organizational mission.

Suggested Citation

  • Rajiv Sethi & Rohini Somanathan, 2023. "Meritocracy and Representation," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 941-957, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:61:y:2023:i:3:p:941-57
    DOI: 10.1257/jel.20221707
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    Cited by:

    1. Barbieri, Stefano & Topolyan, Iryna, 2025. "A tractable group all-pay auction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 226(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I23 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Higher Education; Research Institutions
    • I26 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Returns to Education
    • I28 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Government Policy
    • J15 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Minorities, Races, Indigenous Peoples, and Immigrants; Non-labor Discrimination

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