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Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match

Author

Listed:
  • Federico Echenique
  • Ruy González
  • Alistair J. Wilson
  • Leeat Yariv

Abstract

Most doctors in the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) match with one of their most preferred internship programs. However, surveys indicate doctors' preferences are similar, suggesting a puzzle: how can so many doctors match with their top choices when positions are scarce? We provide one possible explanation. We show that the patterns in the NRMP data may be an artifact of the interview process that precedes the match. Our study highlights the importance of understanding market interactions occurring before and after a matching clearinghouse. It casts doubts on analyses of clearinghouses that take reported preferences at face value.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Echenique & Ruy González & Alistair J. Wilson & Leeat Yariv, 2022. "Top of the Batch: Interviews and the Match," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 223-238, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aerins:v:4:y:2022:i:2:p:223-38
    DOI: 10.1257/aeri.20200800
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yash Kanoria & Seungki Min & Pengyu Qian, 2020. "The Competition for Partners in Matching Markets," Papers 2006.14653, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2023.
    2. Maxwell Allman & Itai Ashlagi, 2023. "Interviewing Matching in Random Markets," Papers 2305.11350, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2023.
    3. Richard Cole & Pranav Jangir, 2025. "Distributed Interview Selection for Stable Matching in Large Random Markets," Papers 2506.19345, arXiv.org.
    4. Maxey, Tyler, 2024. "School choice with costly information acquisition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 248-268.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • J44 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations

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