When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in US Electricity Generation
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Steve Cicala, 2014. "When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel Procurement in U.S. Electricity Generation," NBER Working Papers 20109, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
References listed on IDEAS
- Guerriero, Carmine, 2013.
"The political economy of incentive regulation: Theory and evidence from US states,"
Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 91-107.
- Carmine Guerriero, 2008. "The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from US States," Working Papers 2008.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Guerriero, Carmine, 2008. "The Political Economy of Incentive Regulation: Theory and Evidence from US States," Privatisation Regulation Corporate Governance Working Papers 36755, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
More about this item
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- L71 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
- Q35 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Hydrocarbon Resources
- Q41 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Demand and Supply; Prices
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:105:y:2015:i:1:p:411-44. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael P. Albert). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/aeaaaea.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.