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A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Eduardo M Azevedo & Eric Budish, 2019. "Strategy-proofness in the Large," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 86(1), pages 81-116.
  2. Vohra, Rakesh V., 2015. "Combinatorial Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  3. Thomas Greve & Michael G. Pollitt, 2013. "Network Procurement Auctions," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1347, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  4. Greve, Thomas & Teng, Fei & Pollitt, Michael G. & Strbac, Goran, 2018. "A system operator’s utility function for the frequency response market," Applied Energy, Elsevier, vol. 231(C), pages 562-569.
  5. Scott Duke Kominers & Alexander Teytelboym & Vincent P Crawford, 2017. "An invitation to market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 33(4), pages 541-571.
  6. Isa Hafalir & Hadi Yektaş, 2015. "Core deviation minimizing auctions," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(2), pages 367-376, May.
  7. Lamprirni Zarpala & Dimitris Voliotis, 2022. "A core-selecting auction for portfolio's packages," Papers 2206.11516, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
  8. Sano, Ryuji, 2012. "Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 637-650.
  9. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," PSE Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
  10. A. Talman & Zaifu Yang, 2015. "An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(3), pages 769-784, August.
  11. Kaplan, Todd R. & Zamir, Shmuel, 2015. "Advances in Auctions," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,, Elsevier.
  12. Lamy, Laurent, 2012. "On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 990-999.
  13. Janssen, Maarten & Karamychev, Vladimir, 2016. "Spiteful bidding and gaming in combinatorial clock auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 186-207.
  14. Robert W. Day & Peter Cramton, 2012. "Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 60(3), pages 588-603, June.
  15. Laurent Lamy, 2009. "Ascending auctions: some impossibility results and their resolutions with final price discounts," Working Papers halshs-00575076, HAL.
  16. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2011. "Efficient Combinatorial Exchanges," CARF F-Series CARF-F-258, Center for Advanced Research in Finance, Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo.
  17. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Oleg V. Baranov, 2014. "Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 446-451, May.
  18. Jonathan Levin & Andrzej Skrzypacz, 2016. "Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(9), pages 2528-2551, September.
  19. Lindsay, Luke, 2018. "Shapley value based pricing for auctions and exchanges," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 170-181.
  20. Peter Cramton, 2013. "Spectrum Auction Design," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(2), pages 161-190, March.
  21. Martin Bichler & Pasha Shabalin & Jürgen Wolf, 2013. "Do core-selecting Combinatorial Clock Auctions always lead to high efficiency? An experimental analysis of spectrum auction designs," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 16(4), pages 511-545, December.
  22. Ryuji Sano, 2018. "An equilibrium analysis of a core-selecting package auction with reserve prices," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 22(3), pages 101-122, December.
  23. Thomas Kittsteiner & Marion Ott & Richard Steinberg, 2022. "Competing Combinatorial Auctions," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1130-1137, December.
  24. Alexander Teytelboym, 2019. "Natural capital market design," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 35(1), pages 138-161.
  25. , K. & ,, 2016. "On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(1), January.
  26. Mikhail Safronov, 2016. "A Coasian Approach to Efficient Mechanism Design," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1619, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  27. Janssen, Maarten & Kasberger, Bernhard, 2019. "On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4), November.
  28. Ryuji Sano, 2015. "Improving Efficiency Using Reserve Prices: An Equilibrium Analysis of Core-Selecting Auctions," KIER Working Papers 926, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  29. Henriques, David, 2023. "A combinatorial auction to sell TV broadcasting rights in league sports," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(6).
  30. Ning Sun & Zaifu Yang, 2014. "An Efficient and Incentive Compatible Dynamic Auction for Multiple Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 122(2), pages 422-466.
  31. Akiyoshi Shioura & Zaifu Yang, 2013. "Equilibrium, Auction, Multiple Substitutes and Complements," Discussion Papers 13/17, Department of Economics, University of York.
  32. Benedikt Bünz & Benjamin Lubin & Sven Seuken, 2022. "Designing Core-Selecting Payment Rules: A Computational Search Approach," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 1157-1173, December.
  33. Ott, Marion & Beck, Marissa, 2013. "Incentives for Overbidding in Minimum-Revenue Core-Selecting Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79946, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  34. Daniel Marszalec, 2016. "Auctions For Complements –An Experimental Analysis," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1018, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  35. Bichler, Martin & Goeree, Jacob K., 2017. "Frontiers in spectrum auction design," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 372-391.
  36. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Oleg Baranov, 2020. "Core-selecting auctions with incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 49(1), pages 251-273, March.
  37. Ott, Marion, 2019. "Simple Bayesian and Ex-Post Equilibria in Combinatorial Auctions," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203616, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  38. Janssen, Maarten & Kasberger, Bernhard, 2019. "On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(4).
  39. Mochon, A. & Saez, Y. & Gomez-Barroso, J.L. & Isasi, P., 2012. "Exploring pricing rules in combinatorial sealed-bid auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 462-478.
  40. Marszalec, Daniel, 2018. "Fear not the simplicity - An experimental analysis of auctions for complements," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 81-97.
  41. Maarten Janssen & Vladimir Karamychev, 2013. "Gaming in Combinatorial Clock Auctions," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-027/VII, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 Dec 2013.
  42. Zaifu Yang & Jingsheng Yu, 2018. "Efficient Ascending Menu Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders," Discussion Papers 18/09, Department of Economics, University of York.
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