Core Deviation Minimizing Auctions
AbstractWe study dominant strategy implementable direct mechanisms that minimize the expected surplus from core deviations. Using incentive compatibility conditions, we formulate the core deviation miminimization problem as a calculus of variations problem and then numerically solve it for some particular cases
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business in its series GSIA Working Papers with number 2012-E23.
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Postal: Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890
Web page: http://www.tepper.cmu.edu/
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Paul Klemperer & Aytek Erdil, 2009.
"A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions,"
Economics Series Working Papers
2009-W11, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Aytek Erdil & Paul Klemperer, 2010. "A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(2-3), pages 537-547, 04-05.
- Erdil, Aytek & Klemperer, Paul, 2009. "A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 7487, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Aytek Erdil & Paul Klemperer, 2009. "A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions," Economics Papers 2009-W11, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
- Sano, Ryuji, 2011. "Incentives in core-selecting auctions with single-minded bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 602-606, June.
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