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The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Hans-Peter Weikard & Leo Wangler & Andreas Freytag, 2015. "Minimum Participation Rules with Heterogeneous Countries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 711-727, December.
  2. Rau, Holger & Clemens, Georg, 2014. "Do Leniency Policies facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100509, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  3. Kawasaki, Ryo & Muto, Shigeo, 2009. "Farsighted stability in provision of perfectly "Lumpy" public goods," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 98-109, July.
  4. John Duffy & Huan Xie, 2012. "Group Size and Cooperation Among Strangers," Working Paper 495, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, revised Jan 2012.
  5. Clemens, Georg & Rau, Holger A., 2014. "Do leniency policies facilitate collusion? Experimental evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 130, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
  6. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2008. "Entreprises behavior in cooperative and punishment‘s repeated negotiations," MPRA Paper 37527, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 05 Jan 2009.
  7. OKADA, Akira & 岡田, 章, 2014. "International Cooperation and Institution Formation: A Game Theoretic Perspective," Discussion Papers 2014-17, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
  8. Iñarra García, María Elena & Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción & Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel, 2003. "The Supercore for Normal Form Games," IKERLANAK 2003-04, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
  9. Toshiyuki Hirai, 2018. "Single-payoff farsighted stable sets in strategic games with dominant punishment strategies," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(4), pages 1087-1111, November.
  10. Duffy, John & Xie, Huan, 2016. "Group size and cooperation among strangers," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 126(PA), pages 55-74.
  11. Georg Clemens & Holger A. Rau, 2022. "Either with us or against us: experimental evidence on partial cartels," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(2), pages 237-257, September.
  12. Michael Kosfeld & Akira Okada & Arno Riedl, 2009. "Institution Formation in Public Goods Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1335-1355, September.
  13. Akira Okada, 2008. "The second-order dilemma of public goods and capital accumulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(3), pages 165-182, June.
  14. Inarra, Elena & Concepcion Larrea, M. & Saracho, Ana I., 2007. "The supercore for normal-form games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 530-538, January.
    • Iñarra García, María Elena & Larrea Jaurrieta, María Concepción & Saracho de la Torre, Ana Isabel, 2003. "The Supercore for Normal Form Games," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
  15. Janus, Thorsten & Lim, Jamus Jerome, 2009. "Sticks and carrots: Two incentive mechanisms supporting intra-group cooperation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 177-180, March.
  16. Josef Falkinger, 2004. "Noncooperative Support of Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies," CESifo Working Paper Series 1368, CESifo.
  17. Wolfgang Buchholz & Josef Falkinger & Dirk Rübbelke, 2014. "Non-Governmental Public Norm Enforcement in Large Societies as a Two-Stage Game of Voluntary Public Good Provision," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 16(6), pages 899-916, December.
  18. Roman, Mihai Daniel, 2010. "A game theoretic approach of war with financial influences," MPRA Paper 38389, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Takuma Wakayama & Takehiko Yamato, 2023. "Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 517-553, June.
  20. Sebestyén, Tamás & Braun, Emese, 2022. "Hány fecske csinál nyarat? A nem teljes hálózati szerkezet és az attitűd hatása az együttműködésre [How many swallows make a summer? The impact of incomplete network structure and attitude on coope," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 869-901.
  21. Akira Okada, 2015. "Cooperation and Institution in Games," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 66(1), pages 1-32, March.
  22. Bloch, Francis & van den Nouweland, Anne, 2021. "Myopic and farsighted stable sets in 2-player strategic-form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 663-683.
  23. Robert Finger & Anna Borer, 2013. "Cooperative Management of a Traditional Irrigation System in the Swiss Alps," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 2(1), pages 1-19, January.
  24. Mohan, Vijay, 2019. "On the use of blockchain-based mechanisms to tackle academic misconduct," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 48(9), pages 1-1.
  25. Róbert F. Veszteg & Erita Narhetali, 2010. "Public‐good games and the Balinese," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 37(9), pages 660-675, August.
  26. Pierre Courtois & Guillaume Haeringer, 2012. "Environmental cooperation: ratifying second-best agreements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 565-584, June.
  27. Toshiyuki Hirai, 2017. "The stable set of the social conflict game with commitments: existence, uniqueness, and efficiency," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(1), pages 149-166, March.
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