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The Supercore for Normal Form Games

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Author Info
Elena Iñarra () (UPV/EHU)
Concepción Larrea () (UPV/EHU)
Ana I. Saracho () (UPV/EHU)

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Abstract

We study the supercore of a system derived from a normal form game. For the case of a finite game with pure strategies, we define a sequence of games and show that the supercore of that system coincides with the set of Nash equilibrium strategy profiles of the last game in the sequence. This result is illustrated with the characterization of the supercore for the n-person prisoners´dilemma. With regard to the mixed extension of a normal form game, we show that the set of Nas equilibrium profiles coincides with the supercore for games with a finite number of Nas quilibria. For games with an infinite number of Nash equilibria this need not be no longer the case. Yet, it is not difficult to find a binary relation which guarantees the coincidence of these two sets.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I in its series IKERLANAK with number 200304.

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Date of creation: 11 Nov 2003
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Handle: RePEc:ehu:ikerla:200304

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Postal: Dpto. de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I, Facultad de CC. Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del País Vasco, Avda. Lehendakari Aguirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
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Related research
Keywords: Individual contingent threat situation; Nash equilibrium; subsolution; von Neumann;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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  1. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. E. Kalai & D. Schmeidler, 1975. "An Admissible Set Occurring in Various Bargaining Situations," Discussion Papers 191, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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