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Citations for "Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem"

by Schmitz, Patrick W.

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  1. Roig, Guillem, 2014. "What Determines Market Structure? An Explanation from Cooperative Investment with Non‐Exclusive Co," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) 14-482, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  2. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmitz, 2004. "Can Coasean Bargaining Justify Pigouvian Taxation?," Working Papers, Utrecht School of Economics 04-21, Utrecht School of Economics.
  3. Kazumi Hori, 2014. "Contracting for Multiple Goods under Asymmetric Information: The Two-goods Case," KIER Working Papers 888, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
  4. Hori Kazumi, 2006. "Inefficiency in a Bilateral Trading Problem with Cooperative Investment," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-9, July.
  5. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2002. "On the Interplay of Hidden Action and Hidden Information in Simple Bilateral Trading Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 103(2), pages 444-460, April.
  6. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5292, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  7. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2009. "Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7584, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2008. "Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(1), pages 119-122, April.
  9. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2005. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs and the Property Rights Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. Eahab Elsaid & Wallace Davidson & Xiaoxin Wang, 2011. "CEO successor compensation: outside versus inside successions," Journal of Management and Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 187-205, May.
  11. Grüner, Hans Peter, 2008. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7066, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Lau, Stephanie, 2011. "Investment incentives in bilateral trading," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 538-552.
  13. Segal, Ilya R. & Whinston, Michael D., 2011. "A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 6(1), January.
  14. Robert Gibbons, Editor & John Roberts, Editor, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
  15. Maria Goltsman, 2011. "Optimal information transmission in a holdup problem," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 42(3), pages 495-526, 09.
  16. Engelmann, Dirk & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2013. "Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 9544, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2000. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," MPRA Paper 13447, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  18. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2001. "The Coase Theorem, Private Information, and the Benefits of Not Assigning Property Rights," MPRA Paper 6929, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  19. Erling Røed Larsen & Dag Einar Sommervoll, 2006. "The Impact on Rent from Tenant and Landlord Characteristics and Interaction," Discussion Papers, Research Department of Statistics Norway 467, Research Department of Statistics Norway.
  20. Schmitz, Patrick W, 2001. "The Hold-up Problem and Incomplete Contracts: A Survey of Recent Topics in Contract Theory," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-17, January.
  21. Grüner, Hans Peter & Koriyama, Yukio, 2012. "Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: A possibility theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 152-167.
  22. Blundell,Richard & Newey,Whitney K. & Persson,Torsten (ed.), 2006. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521692083, 9.
  23. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2004. "Job protection laws and agency problems under asymmetric information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(5), pages 1027-1046, October.
  24. Zhao, Rui R., 2008. "Rigidity in bilateral trade with holdup," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
  25. M'hand Fares, 2006. "Renegotiation Design and Contract Solutions to the Hold-Up Problem," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(5), pages 731-756, December.
  26. Schweizer, Urs, 2006. "Universal possibility and impossibility results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 73-85, October.
  27. Schmitz, Patrick W., 2010. "On contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments," MPRA Paper 23157, University Library of Munich, Germany.