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Divided government and U.S. trade policy: theory and evidence

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Paola Conconi & Giovanni Facchini & Maurizio Zanardi, 2012. "Fast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 146-189, August.
  2. Dreher, Axel & Voigt, Stefan, 2011. "Does membership in international organizations increase governments' credibility? Testing the effects of delegating powers," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 326-348, September.
  3. Andrew Stravers, 2021. "Pork, parties, and priorities: Partisan politics and overseas military deployments," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 38(2), pages 156-177, March.
  4. Paul K. Huth & Todd L. Allee, 2002. "Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 46(6), pages 754-790, December.
  5. Sojli, Elvira & Tham, Wing Wah, 2015. "Divided governments and futures prices," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 187(2), pages 622-633.
  6. Gawande, Kishore & Krishna, Pravin & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2009. "What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 491-532, July.
  7. Levent Celik & Bilgehan Karabay & John McLaren, 2015. "When Is It Optimal to Delegate: The Theory of Fast-Track Authority," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 347-389, August.
  8. Cornelia Woll & Alvaro Artigas, 2007. "When trade liberalization turns into regulatory reform: The impact on business–government relations in international trade politics," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 1(2), pages 121-138, June.
  9. Henisz, Witold J. & Zelner, Bennet A., 2006. "Interest Groups, Veto Points, and Electricity Infrastructure Deployment," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 60(1), pages 263-286, January.
  10. Gary Winslett, 2016. "Public Opinion Distribution and Party Competition in US Trade Policy," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(8), pages 1128-1145, August.
  11. Cornelia Woll & Alvaro Artigas, 2007. "When Trade Liberalization Turns into Regulatory Reform: The Impact on Business-Government Relations in International Trade Politics," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/8526, Sciences Po.
  12. Ji-Hyang Jang, 2010. "Varieties of State in the International Political Economy of Developing Countries," International Area Studies Review, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, vol. 13(3), pages 145-165, September.
  13. Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, 1997. "Democratic Politics and International Trade Negotiations," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 117-146, February.
  14. Xinyuan Dai, 2006. "Dyadic Myth and Monadic Advantage," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 18(3), pages 267-297, July.
  15. Celik, Levent & Karabay, Bilgehan & McLaren, John, 2020. "Fast-track authority: A hold-up interpretation," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
  16. Thomas Konig & Jonathan Slapin, 2004. "Bringing Parliaments Back in," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(3), pages 357-394, July.
  17. Mat McCubbins & Roger Noll & Barry Weingast, 2005. "The Political Economy of Law: Decision-Making by Judicial, Legislative, Executive and Administrative Agencies," Discussion Papers 04-035, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  18. Fabio Franchino, 2000. "Control of the Commission's Executive Functions," European Union Politics, , vol. 1(1), pages 63-92, February.
  19. David Brulé, 2006. "Congressional Opposition, the Economy, and U.S. Dispute Initiation, 1946-2000," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(4), pages 463-483, August.
  20. J. Broz, 2011. "The United States Congress and IMF financing, 1944–2009," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 341-368, September.
  21. Cornelia Woll & Alvaro Artigas, 2007. "When Trade Liberalization Turns into Regulatory Reform: The Impact on Business-Government Relations in International Trade Politics," Post-Print hal-01071209, HAL.
  22. Aurélie Cassette & Etienne Farvaque, 2022. "American and Australian Tariff Policies: Do They Rock or Tango or Roll?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(20), pages 1-14, October.
  23. Robert Pahre, 1998. "Reactions and Reciprocity," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 42(4), pages 467-492, August.
  24. Victoria Pistikou, 2020. "The Impact of CEFTA on Exports, Economic Growth and Development," International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research (IJBESAR), International Hellenic University (IHU), Kavala Campus, Greece (formerly Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Institute of Technology - EMaTTech), vol. 13(3), pages 15-31, December.
  25. Buzard, Kristy, 2017. "Self-enforcing trade agreements and lobbying," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 226-242.
  26. Kim, Chansog (Francis) & Pantzalis, Christos & Chul Park, Jung, 2012. "Political geography and stock returns: The value and risk implications of proximity to political power," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 196-228.
  27. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8526 is not listed on IDEAS
  28. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "Early birds: Special interests and the strategic logic of international cooperation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 113-140, July.
  29. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/8526 is not listed on IDEAS
  30. Cornelia Woll & Alvaro Artigas, 2007. "When Trade Liberalization Turns into Regulatory Reform: The Impact on Business-Government Relations in International Trade Politics," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01071209, HAL.
  31. David H. Clark, 2001. "Trading Butter for Guns," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 45(5), pages 636-660, October.
  32. Sherman, Richard, 2002. "Import prices and the political economy of tariffs: evidence from Germany, Japan, and the United States, 1954-1994," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 11-17, June.
  33. Trofimov, Ivan D., 2017. "Political economy of trade protection and liberalization: in search of agency-based and holistic framework of policy change," MPRA Paper 79504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  34. Kim, Kwang-ho, 2007. "Favoritism and reverse discrimination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 101-123, January.
  35. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8526 is not listed on IDEAS
  36. Fabio Franchino, 2000. "The Commission's Executive Discretion, Information and Comitology," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(2), pages 155-181, April.
  37. Robert Pahre, 1997. "Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the European Union," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 41(1), pages 147-174, February.
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