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An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests

Citations

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Cited by:

  1. Susanne Lohmann & Deborah M. Weiss, 2002. "Hidden Taxes and Representative Government: The Political Economy of the Ramsey Rule," Public Finance Review, , vol. 30(6), pages 579-611, November.
  2. Krzysztof Pelc & Johannes Urpelainen, 2015. "When do international economic agreements allow countries to pay to breach?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 231-264, June.
  3. Andreas Broscheid & David Coen, 2003. "Insider and Outsider Lobbying of the European Commission," European Union Politics, , vol. 4(2), pages 165-189, June.
  4. David Strömberg, 2015. "Media and Politics," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 173-205, August.
  5. Mark Schelker & Reiner Eichenberger, 2008. "Rethinking Public Auditing Institutions: Empirical Evidence from Swiss Municipalities," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-06, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
  6. Jo Thori Lind & Dominic Rohner, 2017. "Knowledge is Power: A Theory of Information, Income and Welfare Spending," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 84(336), pages 611-646, October.
  7. Martimort, David, 2019. ""When Olson Meets Dahl": From Inefficient Groups Formation to Inefficient Policy-Making," CEPR Discussion Papers 13843, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2002. "Lobbying Legislatures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 919-948, August.
  9. Matthias Dahm & Robert Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2009. "Lobbying of Firms by Voters," Working Papers 080926, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  10. Schelker, Mark & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2010. "Auditors and fiscal policy: Empirical evidence on a little big institution," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 357-380, December.
  11. Donald Wittman, 2009. "How Pressure Groups Activate Voters and Move Candidates Closer to the Median," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(540), pages 1324-1343, October.
  12. Joshua R. Hendrickson & Alexander William Salter, 2020. "Options To The Realm: A Cost Neutral Proposal To Improve Political Incentives," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(3), pages 515-529, July.
  13. David K Levine & Salvatore Modica, 2013. "Peer Discipline and the Strength of Organizations," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000000713, UCLA Department of Economics.
  14. Lunder, Trond Erik, 2016. "Between centralized and decentralized welfare policy: Have national guidelines constrained the influence of local preferences?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-13.
  15. Jonathan Boston & Frieder Lempp, 2011. "Climate change," Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 24(8), pages 1000-1021, October.
  16. Johannes Urpelainen, 2011. "Early birds: Special interests and the strategic logic of international cooperation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 113-140, July.
  17. Jan Auerbach, 2018. "Office-Holding Premia and Representative Democracy," Discussion Papers 1802, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
  18. Balles, Patrick & Matter, Ulrich & Stutzer, Alois, 2018. "Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention," Economics Working Paper Series 1813, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
  19. Sam Bucovetsky & Amihai Glazer, 2006. "How To Avoid Awarding a Valuable Asset," Working Papers 050619, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  20. Bueno de Mesquita, Ethan & Landa, Dimitri, 2015. "Political accountability and sequential policymaking," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 95-108.
  21. Le Bihan, Patrick, 2015. "Popular Referendum and Electoral Accountability," IAST Working Papers 15-31, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
  22. Nicolas Motz, 2019. "Who emerges from smoke-filled rooms? Political parties and candidate selection," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 52(1), pages 161-196, January.
  23. Brian C. Albrecht & Joshua R. Hendrickson & Alexander William Salter, 2022. "Evolution, uncertainty, and the asymptotic efficiency of policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 169-188, July.
  24. Donati, Dante, 2023. "Mobile Internet access and political outcomes: Evidence from South Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 162(C).
  25. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
  26. de Gorter, Harry, 2008. "Explaining Inefficient Policy Instruments," Agricultural Distortions Working Paper Series 48638, World Bank.
  27. Wittman, Donald, 2007. "Candidate quality, pressure group endorsements and the nature of political advertising," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 360-378, June.
  28. Myerson, Roger, 1999. "Informational origins of political bias towards critical groups of voters," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 767-778, April.
  29. Abmann, Christian & Henning, Christian H.C.A. & Krampe, Eva, 2012. "Constitutional Rules, Informal Institutions and Agricultural Protection in Developing and Industrial Countries: Theory and Empirical Evidence," 2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington 124885, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
  30. Levine, David K. & Modica, Salvatore, 2017. "Size, fungibility, and the strength of lobbying organizations," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 71-83.
  31. Landa, Dimitri & Le Bihan, Patrick, 2015. "Policy Unbundling and Special Interest Politics," IAST Working Papers 15-32, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST).
  32. Carl Vikberg, 2020. "Explaining interest group access to the European Commission’s expert groups," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(2), pages 312-332, June.
  33. Victor Tanaka, 2010. "The ‘informal sector’ and the political economy of development," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 295-317, October.
  34. Matsusaka, John G., 2018. "Special Interest Influence under Direct versus Representative Democracy," Working Papers 278, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
  35. Iljoong Kim & Inbae Kim, 2005. "Endogenous changes in the exchange rate regime: A bureaucratic incentive model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 339-361, December.
  36. Ganesh Manjhi & Meeta Keswani Mehra, 2019. "A Dynamic Analysis of Special Interest Politics and Electoral Competition," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 142-164, March.
  37. Bhattacharya, Sourav & Kundu, Tapas, 2014. "Resistance, redistribution and investor-friendliness," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 124-142.
  38. Manfred J. Holler & Isidoro Mazza, 2013. "Cultural heritage: public decision-making and implementation," Chapters, in: Ilde Rizzo & Anna Mignosa (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Cultural Heritage, chapter 2, pages i-i, Edward Elgar Publishing.
  39. Valentino Larcinese, 2007. "The Instrumental Voter Goes To the Newsagent," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(3), pages 249-276, July.
  40. Lindsey Gailmard, 2022. "Electoral accountability and political competence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(2), pages 236-261, April.
  41. Susanne Lohmann, 2003. "Representative Government and Special Interest Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 15(3), pages 299-319, July.
  42. Roger Congleton, 2007. "Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 333-352, September.
  43. Hugh Ward, 2004. "Pressure Politics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 31-52, January.
  44. Xinyuan Dai, 2006. "The Conditional Nature of Democratic Compliance," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(5), pages 690-713, October.
  45. Piketty, Thomas, 1999. "The information-aggregation approach to political institutions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 791-800, April.
  46. Mazza, Isidoro & van Winden, Frans, 2008. "An endogenous policy model of hierarchical government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 133-149, January.
  47. Francisco Candel-Sánchez & Juan Perote-Peña, 2013. "A political economy model of market intervention," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 169-181, October.
  48. Georges Casamatta, 2003. "The Political Power of the Retirees in a Two‐Dimensional Voting Model," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 5(4), pages 571-591, October.
  49. Sobbrio, Francesco, 2009. "Indirect Lobbying and Media Bias," MPRA Paper 18215, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  50. Matthias Dahm & Robert Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2014. "How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 63-82, April.
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