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On the (im)possibility of improving upon the student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism

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  • Kesten, Onur
  • Kurino, Morimitsu
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    Abstract

    This paper studies a general school choice problem with or without outside options. The Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism (DA) has played a central role not only in theory but also in important practical applications. We show that in problems where some students cannot credibly submit a single school as the only acceptable option, it is possible to improve upon DA without sacrificing strategyproofness. On the other hand, in unrestricted problems where no outside options necessarily exist, it is not possible to improve upon DA via a strategy-proof mechanism. -- Es wird ein allgemeines school-choice-Problem untersucht mit und ohne outside options. Der Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance-Mechanismus (DA) spielt eine zentrale Rolle nicht nur in der Theorie sondern auch in wichtigen praktischen Anwendungen. Wir zeigen, dass in Situationen, in denen einige Schüler nicht glaubwürdig nur eine einzige Schule als akzeptable Option angeben können, der DA verbessert werden kann, ohne dass die Nichtmanipulierbarkeit (strategy proofness) des Mechanismus dafür geopfert werden muss. Auf der anderen Seite gilt für Situationen, in denen nicht notwendigerweise outside options existieren, dass der DA nicht verbessert werden kann mit Hilfe eines nichtmanipulierbaren Mechanismus.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior with number SP II 2012-202.

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    Date of creation: 2012
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2012202

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    Related research

    Keywords: student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism; strategy-proofness; Pareto dominance; outside options;

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    1. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Tayfun Sönmez, 2003. "School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 93(3), pages 729-747, June.
    2. Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Parag Pathak & Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez, 2006. "Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism," NBER Working Papers 11965, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Aytek Erdil & Haluk Ergin, 2007. "What`s the Matter with Tie-breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice," Economics Series Working Papers 349, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    4. Balinski, Michel & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 73-94, January.
    5. Aytek Erdil, 2013. "Strategy-Proof Stochastic Assignment," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 1333, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
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