Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Die Vermeidung von Bank Runs und der Erhalt von Marktdisziplin: Das Dilemma der Bankenregulierung?

Contents:

Author Info

  • Günther, Susanne
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Das Vertrauen privater Einleger in ihre Banken spielt eine wichtige ökonomische und regulatorische Rolle, da sein Verlust Systeminstabilität herbeiführen kann. Die Vermeidung von Bank Runs ist die Intention von Einlagensicherungssystemen. Im deutschen Bankensystem werden Einleger durch zwei unterschiedliche Konzepte abgesichert: Zum einen durch die Einlagen- und zum anderen durch die Institutssicherung. Erstere soll den Erhalt von 100.000 Euro im Falle einer Bankeninsolvenz sicherstellen, während letztere 100 Prozent des bei einer Bank gehaltenen Vermögens sichern und genau genommen den Insolvenzfall selbst vermeiden soll. In der Theorie führt eine solche Absicherung zu einem erheblichen Verlust an Marktdisziplin. Dieses Arbeitspapier identifiziert Unterschiede im Bankkundenverhalten unter Berücksichtigung dieser unterschiedlichen Sicherungskonzepte und unterschiedlicher Fälligkeiten der Bankpassiva, zum einen Sicht- und Spareinlagen und zum anderen Inhaberschuldverschreibungen. Darüber hinaus stellt sich ein begründeter Verdacht heraus, dass sowohl das Geschäftsmodell als auch die Größe einer Bank eine wichtige Vertrauenskomponente darstellen. Diese beruht vermutlich auf der Annahme impliziter Staatsgarantien. -- The trust in banks by private depositors plays an important economic and regulatory role, since they have the power to destabilize financial systems by bank runs. In order to prevent such runs, deposit insurance systems are widely introduced. With regard to the German banking system, deposits, or to be more precise, sight and saving deposits are covered by two different concepts: The deposit and the institute insurance concept. The former one protects 100.000 Euro of each private depositor in case of a bank's liquidation, whereas the latter one is supposed to guarantee 100 percent of private wealth hold at credit institutes. In the strict sense, it is supposed to prevent bankruptcy. In theory, these insurances lead to a deficit in depositors' market discipline. This Working Paper reveals differences between the behaviour of bank clients referring to these diverse systems, and to different maturities, i.e. sight and saving deposits comparing to bearer bonds. Furthermore, there is a reasonable suspicion that a bank's size plays an important role for trust, independent of the insurance concept, probably assuming implicit government guarantees.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/97485/1/786985887.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Westfälsche Wilhelms-Universität Münster (WWU), Institut für Genossenschaftswesen in its series Arbeitspapiere with number 142.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 2014
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:zbw:wwuifg:142

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Am Stadtgraben 9, 48143 Münster
    Phone: +49 (0)251 83-2 28 90
    Fax: +49 (0)251 83-2 28 04
    Web page: http://www.ifg-muenster.de/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Sangkyun Park & Stavros Peristiani, 2001. "Are bank shareholders enemies of regulators or a potential source of market discipline?," Staff Reports, Federal Reserve Bank of New York 138, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    2. Vasso P. Ioannidou & Jan de Dreu, 2005. "The impact of explicit deposit insurance on market discipline," Proceedings 992, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    3. O'Hara, Maureen & Shaw, Wayne, 1990. " Deposit Insurance and Wealth Effects: The Value of Being "Too Big to Fail."," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1587-1600, December.
    4. Edward J. Kane & Asli Demirguc-Kunt, 2001. "Deposit Insurance Around the Globe: Where Does it Work?," NBER Working Papers 8493, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Park, Sangkyun & Peristiani, Stavros, 1998. "Market Discipline by Thrift Depositors," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(3), pages 347-64, August.
    6. Douglas W. Diamond, 2007. "Banks and liquidity creation : a simple exposition of the Diamond-Dybvig model," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Spr, pages 189-200.
    7. Roberto Steiner & Adolfo Barajas, 2000. "Depositor Behavior and Market Discipline in Colombia," IMF Working Papers 00/214, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Huizinga, Harry, 2004. "Market discipline and deposit insurance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 375-399, March.
    9. Semenova Maria, 2007. "How depositors discipline banks: the case of Russia," EERC Working Paper Series 07-02e, EERC Research Network, Russia and CIS.
    10. Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN, 1998. "Liquidity Creation through Banks and Markets : Multiple Insurance and Limited Market Access," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP), Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP 9820, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
    11. Calomiris, Charles W & Kahn, Charles M, 1991. "The Role of Demandable Debt in Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 497-513, June.
    12. Douglas W. Diamond, . "Liquidity, Banks and Markets," CRSP working papers 326, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    13. Saibal Ghosh & Abhiman Das, 2004. "Market Discipline in Indian Bank: Does the Data Tell a Story," Industrial Organization, EconWPA 0411005, EconWPA.
    14. Urs Birchler & Andréa M. Maechler, 2001. "Do Depositors Discipline Swiss Banks?," Working Papers 01.06, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
    15. Roland Vaubel, 2013. "Probleme der Bankenunion: Falsche Lehren aus der Krise," Credit and Capital Markets, Credit and Capital Markets, Credit and Capital Markets, vol. 46(3), pages 281-302.
    16. Avery, Robert B & Belton, Terrence M & Goldberg, Michael A, 1988. "Market Discipline in Regulating Bank Risk: New Evidence from the Capital Markets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(4), pages 597-610, November.
    17. Morrison, Alan D. & White, Lucy, 2011. "Deposit insurance and subsidized recapitalizations," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 35(12), pages 3400-3416.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:wwuifg:142. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.