It's the occupation, stupid! Explaining candidates' success in low-information local elections
AbstractWe analyze the effects of personal characteristics of 4239 political candidates on their performance in local elections in Germany. Our results show that a candidate's occupation plays a decisive role. Occupational effects can be explained by (a) an occupation's public reputation and (b) public renownedness of individuals carrying out certain occupations. The findings regarding the occupational reputation effects are strongly correlated with polls on occupational reputation/prestige in the US and Germany. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association in its series Annual Conference 2011 (Frankfurt, Main): The Order of the World Economy - Lessons from the Crisis with number 48682.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
low-information elections; local elections; occupational reputation; political economy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- J01 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - Labor Economics: General
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