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Aktienkursorientierte Management-Entlohnung: Ein Wettbewerbshemmnis im Boom?

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  • Neubecker, Leslie
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    Abstract

    In bisherigen Untersuchungen der Auswirkungen aktienkursorientierter Management-Entlohnung auf den Preiswettbewerb wurden Nachfrageschwankungen nicht berücksichtigt. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass Manager auch dann eine größere Kollusionsneigung besitzen als Eigentümer, wenn sich die Nachfrage nach einem differenzierten Gut sowie die Erwartungen über ihre zukünftige Entwicklung ändern. Durch Berücksichtigung von Nachfragefluktuationen können auch Veränderungen der Wettbewerbsintensität erklärt werden. Entwickelt sich die Nachfrage rein stochastisch, ist die Kollusionsneigung der Manager in Rezessionen höher. Schwankt die Nachfrage dagegen zyklisch, können die Manager bei steigender Nachfrage höhere kollusive Preise durchsetzen, da im Boom die entgangenen Gewinne bei Bestrafung größer sind. -- In the recent research on the effect of stock-based incentive compensation for managers on the degree of collusion, demand fluctuations are not taken into account. This paper shows that if demand for a differentiated good as well as expectations of future demand change over time, managers with stock-based remuneration still have a greater incentive to collude than do firm-owners. By accounting of demand fluctuations we are also able to explain changes in the intensity of competition over time. If demand is stochastic, managers can set higher collusive prices in recessions. If demand follows a cyclical pattern, collusion among managers is more intense in periods of rising demand due to the relatively high forgone future profits in the punishment phase.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics in its series Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge with number 225.

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    Date of creation: 2001
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:225

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    Keywords: Lohn; Management;

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    1. Domowitz, Ian & Hubbard, R Glenn & Petersen, Bruce C, 1987. "Oligopoly Supergames: Some Empirical Evidence on Prices and Margins," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 35(4), pages 379-98, June.
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    3. Chaim Fershtman & Kenneth L Judd, 1984. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," Discussion Papers 642, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Eli Ofek & David Yermack, 2000. "Taking Stock: Equity-Based Compensation and the Evolution of Managerial Ownership," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(3), pages 1367-1384, 06.
    5. Martin J. Conyon & Richard B. Freeman, 2002. "Shared modes of compensation and firm performance: UK evidence," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20060, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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    8. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
    9. Yermack, David, 1995. "Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2-3), pages 237-269.
    10. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691, August.
    11. Conyon, Martin & Gregg, Paul & Machin, Stephen, 1995. "Taking Care of Business, Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 704-14, May.
    12. Rosenbaum, David I. & Sukharomana, Supachat, 2001. "Oligopolistic pricing over the deterministic market demand cycle: some evidence from the US Portland cement industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 863-884, May.
    13. Reitman, David, 1993. "Stock Options and the Strategic Use of Managerial Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 513-24, June.
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    Cited by:
    1. Pitterle, Ingo & Steffen, Dirk, 2004. "Welfare Effects of Fiscal Policy under Alternative Exchange Rate Regimes : The Role of the Scale Variable of Money Demand," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 284, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    2. Baten, Jörg & Wallusch, Jacek, 2003. "Market integration and disintegration of Poland and Gemany [Germany] in the 18th century," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 268, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    3. Stadler, Manfred, 2003. "Innovation and growth: The role of labor-force qualification," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 255, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    4. Koepke, Nikola & Baten, Joerg, 2005. "The biological standard of living in Europe during the last two millennia," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 9(01), pages 61-95, April.
    5. Neubecker, Leslie, 2002. "Aktienkursorientierte Management-Entlohnung bei korrelierter Entwicklung der Marktnachfrage," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 235, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.

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