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Aktienkursorientierte Management-Entlohnung bei korrelierter Entwicklung der Marktnachfrage

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  • Neubecker, Leslie
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    Abstract

    Dieser Beitrag zeigt, dass aktienkursabhängige Entlohnung bei korrelierter Nachfrageentwicklung die Neigung der Manager erhöht, eine implizite Preisabsprache einzuhalten. Die geringeren Gewinne in der Strafphase führen bereits in der Ausbruchsperiode zu einem niedrigeren Aktienkurs und damit zu einer geringeren Vergütung. Der Anreiz abzuweichen ist daher kleiner als bei anderen Entlohnungsverträgen. Ändert sich die Nachfrage durch stochastischen Wechsel zwischen einer höheren und einer niedrigeren Wachstumsrate, führt unverzögerte aktienkursabhängige Entlohnung zu einer schwach prozyklischen bei positiver und zu einer schwach antizyklischen Preisentwicklung bei negativer Korrelation. Durch verzögerte Entlohnung werden die Manager zu perfekter Kollusion veranlasst. In diesem Fall setzen sie die Preise azyklisch. -- We show that stock-based management compensation increases the incentive to uphold a collusive agreement when market demand fluctuates stochastically. Lower profits in the punishment phase already reduce the share price and thereby remuneration in the period of deviation. The incentive to deviate is thus lower than with other types of compensation. If demand changes stochastically between a high and low growth rate, managers with undeferred stock-based remuneration set prices weakly procyclically with positive and weakly anticyclically with negative correlation. Deferred compensation induces managers to collude perfectly. In this case prices are acyclical.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics in its series Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge with number 235.

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    Date of creation: 2002
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:tuedps:235

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    Keywords: Lohn; management compensation; dynamic competition; collusion;

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    References

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    1. Conyon, Martin & Gregg, Paul & Machin, Stephen, 1995. "Taking Care of Business, Executive Compensation in the United Kingdom," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 704-14, May.
    2. Abreu, Dilip, 1986. "Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 191-225, June.
    3. Neubecker, Leslie, 2001. "Aktienkursorientierte Management-Entlohnung: Ein Wettbewerbshemmnis im Boom?," Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 225, University of Tübingen, School of Business and Economics.
    4. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    5. Kandori, Michihiro, 1991. "Correlated Demand Shocks and Price Wars during Booms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 171-80, January.
    6. Reitman, David, 1993. "Stock Options and the Strategic Use of Managerial Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 513-24, June.
    7. Kyle Bagwell, 1992. "Commitment and Observability in Games," Discussion Papers 1014, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
    9. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December.
    10. Yermack, David, 1995. "Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2-3), pages 237-269.
    11. Hamilton, James D, 1989. "A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonstationary Time Series and the Business Cycle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(2), pages 357-84, March.
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