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Generalised Gately Values of Cooperative Games

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  • Gilles, Robert P.
  • Mallozzi, Lina

Abstract

We investigate Gately's solution concept for cooperative games with transferable utilities. Gately's conception is a bargaining solution and minimises the maximal quantified 'propensity to disrupt' the negotiation of the players over the allocation of the generated collective payoffs. Gately's solution concept is well-defined for a broad class of games. We consider a generalisation based on a parameter-based quantification of the propensity to disrupt. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship of these generalised Gately values with the Core. Gately's solution is in the Core for all regular 3-player games. We identify precise conditions under which generalised Gately values are Core imputations for arbitrary regular cooperative games. We devise an axiomatisation of the Gately value for the class of regular cooperative games. We conclude the paper with an application of the Gately value to the measurement of power in hierarchical social networks.

Suggested Citation

  • Gilles, Robert P. & Mallozzi, Lina, 2022. "Generalised Gately Values of Cooperative Games," QBS Working Paper Series 2022/06, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:qmsrps:202206
    DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.4232786
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperative TU-game; sharing values; Gately point; Core;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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