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Usurpation statt Delegation: Wie der EuGH die Binnenmarktintegration radikalisiert und warum er politischer Kontrolle bedarf


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  • Höpner, Martin
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    Die in den Jahren 2007 und 2008 ergangenen EuGH-Urteile in den Fällen Viking, Laval, Rüffert und Kommission gegen Luxemburg haben Irritationen in Politik und Verbänden hervorgerufen und eine kontroverse Diskussion zum Stand der europäischen Wirtschaftsintegration und zum Stellenwert der Integration durch Recht angestoßen. Dieser Aufsatz schlägt eine historisch-institutionalistische Perspektive auf den EuGH vor und stellt die jüngste Urteilsserie in den Kontext eines langen Prozesses politisch unkontrollierter Usurpation von Zuständigkeiten. Die vier Urteile beruhen auf Grundlagen, die ihrerseits durch Richterrecht geschaffen wurden: Vorrang europäischen Primär- und Sekundärrechts, Direktwirkung und Drittwirkung auf Private, allgemeine Beschränkungsverbote (statt Nichtdiskriminierung), soziale Grundrechte als allgemeine Rechtsgrundsätze der Gemeinschaft. Der Beitrag diskutiert die machtpolitischen Quellen der Handlungsfreiheit des EuGH und hinterfragt, ob eine Aufnahme sozialer Grundrechte in die europäischen Verträge die vom Gericht angestoßene Radikalisierung der Binnenmarktintegration stoppen würde. Zur Erreichung dieses Ziels ist eine politisch kontrollierte Selbstzurückhaltung des EuGH notwendig, die im Sinne des Art. 137 Abs. 5 EGV den autonomieschonenden Umgang mit nationalen Lösungen zum Ausgleich zwischen sozialer Demokratie und kapitalistischer Ökonomie sicherstellt. -- The 2007 and 2008 ECJ decisions on Viking, Laval, Rüffert and Commission versus Luxembourg have caused political irritations and sparked a controversial debate on the state of European economic integration and integration through law. The paper offers a historical-institutionalist perspective and puts the recent controversial rulings in the context of a long history of politically uncontrolled usurpation of competencies. The four ECJ decisions rely on principles that were constructed by case law: supremacy, direct effect, bans on restrictions on the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by European law (rather than non-discrimination) and social fundamental rights as elements of the general principles of Community law. The paper discusses the sources of the ECJ's freedom to introduce new principles and questions whether an inclusion of social fundamental rights in European Union treaties would put a stop to the judicially imposed radicalization of common market integration. I doubt that such an inclusion would fundamentally change the situation. Rather, in order to maintain distinct national solutions to the conflict between social democracy and capitalist economy, the paper recommends a strategy of politically enforced judicial self-restraint (in the sense of Article 137 [5] EC).

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    Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in its series MPIfG Discussion Paper with number 08/12.

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    Date of creation: 2008
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:mpifgd:0812

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    1. Eichhorst, Werner, 2000. "Europäische Sozialpolitik zwischen nationaler Autonomie und Marktfreiheit: Die Entsendung von Arbeitnehmern in der EU," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 40, number 40.
    2. Garrett, Geoffrey, 1992. "International cooperation and institutional choice: the European Community's internal market," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(02), pages 533-560, March.
    3. Scharpf, Fritz W., 1999. "Regieren in Europa: Effektiv und demokratisch?," Schriften aus dem Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung Köln, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, volume 0, number sbd-1999.
    4. Mattli, Walter & Slaughter, Anne-Marie, 1998. "Revisiting the European Court of Justice," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(01), pages 177-209, December.
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    Cited by:
    1. Jean-Claude Barbier & Fabrice Colomb, 2011. "The unbearable foreignness of EU law in social policy, a sociological approach to law-making," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11065, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    2. Grimmel, Andreas, 2011. "Politics in robes? The European Court of Justice and the myth of judicial activism," Discussion Papers 2/11, Europa-Kolleg Hamburg, Institute for European Integration.
    3. Jean-Claude Barbier & Fabrice Colomb, 2011. "The unbearable foreignness of EU law in social policy, a sociological approach to law-making," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00639906, HAL.
    4. Andreas Grimmel, 2011. "Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor," Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po, Centre d'études européennes (CEE) at Sciences Po, Paris 3, Centre d'études européennes (CEE) at Sciences Po, Paris.


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