Policy Deviations, Uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice
AbstractThe implementation of European Union directives into national law is at the discretion of member states. We analyze incentives for member states to deviate from these directives when the European Commission may sue a defecting member state and rulings at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) are uncertain. We find that higher uncertainty about the preferences of the ECJ increases policy deviation, irrespective of whether a case is taken to court or not. If decisions of member states to deviate are independent, the incidence of filed cases decreases while for thos policies reaching the ECJ deviations increase.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 201309.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in
European Union law; directives; compliance; European Court of Justice; court behavior; uncertainty; legal process; European Commission;
Other versions of this item:
- Carsten Hefeker & Michael Neugart, 2013. "Policy Deviations, Uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice," Volkswirtschaftliche DiskussionsbeitrÃ¤ge 159-13, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
- Carsten Hefeker & Michael Neugart, 2013. "Policy Deviations, Uncertainty, and the European Court of Justice," CESifo Working Paper Series 4143, CESifo Group Munich.
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-EEC-2013-03-09 (European Economics)
- NEP-EUR-2013-03-09 (Microeconomic European Issues)
- NEP-REG-2013-03-09 (Regulation)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bernd Hayo).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.