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Bahnliberalisierung in der Europäischen Union: Die Rolle des EuGH als politischer und politisch restringierter Akteur bei der Transformation staatsnaher Sektoren

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  • Dederke, Julian
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    Abstract

    Ehemals staatliche oder staatsnahe Sektoren wie der Schienenverkehr sind im Zuge der Europäischen Integration und des Binnenmarktprojekts einem markt- und wettbewerbsorientierten Liberalisierungsprozess ausgesetzt. Diesen treibt die Europäische Kommission (KOM) auf verschiedenen Wegen voran. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht eine Reihe von Vertragsverletzungsklagen der KOM gegen Mitgliedstaaten (MS), die keine ausreichenden Umsetzungsschritte bei der Eisenbahnliberalisierung ergriffen hätten. Mit dieser Klagewelle erhielt der EuGH erstmals die Möglichkeit zur Rechtsauslegung im Schienenverkehrssektor und fällte unterschiedliche Urteile. Die Arbeit fragt nach den Gründen für die Differenzierung im Angesicht der Rolle des EuGH als politischer und politisch restringierter Akteur. Diese wird in der wissenschaftlichen Debatte unterschiedlich bewertet: integrationsorientierter Liberalisierungsmotor einerseits, politisch restringiert innerhalb des politischen Umfelds andererseits. Anknüpfend an eine Debatte im American Political Science Review werden konkurrierende Hypothesen zur politischen Autonomie des EuGH generiert. In den Verfahren kam es zu zahlreichen Interventionen durch MS, die als Streithelfer aufseiten der Verklagten auftraten. Die Befunde der Arbeit weisen den Streithelfern in der untersuchten Klagewelle jedoch keinen zentralen Einfluss zu. Dagegen folgten die RichterInnen fast ausnahmslos den Empfehlungen des EuGH-Generalanwalts, der als unabhängiger Sachverständiger sachlich differenziert einzelne Rügen in Klageverfahren bestätigt oder zurückweist. Dies traf sowohl bei Empfehlungen zugunsten der Klägerin (KOM) als auch zugunsten der Verklagten (MS) zu. Das Urteilsmuster des EuGH zeigt außerdem, dass er Bahn-Holdingmodelle - als vertikal integrierte Unternehmensstrukturen einer der stärksten Konfliktpunkte zwischen KOM und MS - toleriert. Eine grundsätzlich liberalisierende und KOM-freundliche Positionierung des EuGH ist nicht erkennbar. -- Former public sectors or sectors close to the state (staatsnahe Sektoren) like rail transport are exposed to a market- and competition-based liberalisation process in the context of European integration and the single market project. The European Commission (COM) promotes liberalisation in various ways. This paper analyses a number of infringement lawsuits led by COM against several member states (MSs) accused of not having transposed the sectoral directives on railway liberalisation properly. These lawsuits allowed the ECJ to interpret the European legislation on rail transport for the first time. The role of the ECJ as political and politically restricted actor is evaluated differently in the scientific debate. On the one hand, the ECJ is argued to be an integrationist engine of liberalization. On the other hand, it is perceived to be bounded by its political surroundings. The judgments in the cases considered differ and the paper asks for the reason for this differentiation. For this purpose, following a debate in the American Political Science Review, competing hypotheses concerning the ECJ's political autonomy are generated and tested statistically. Since many MSs decided to intervene as third parties in support of other MSs during the proceedings at a first glance the interventions seemed to be of vital importance. However, the results don't support assumptions of MS interveners playing a key role in the observed lawsuits. Against this, the judges followed the court's Advocate General nearly without exception, who as an independent expert witness confirms or rejects individual complaints of an infringement process in a factual manner. This holds true for recommendations in favour of the plaintiff (COM) as well as for those in favour of the indictee (MS). Beyond this, the judgment pattern shows that railway company holding models are tolerated by the ECJ. Such vertically integrated firm structures have been one of the core points of contention between COM and MS. In this paper, I do not find evidence that the ECJ holds a strict bias in favor of liberalisation or the European Commission.

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    Paper provided by Free University Berlin, Center for International Political Economy in its series PIPE - Papers on International Political Economy with number 20/2014.

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    Date of creation: 2014
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    Handle: RePEc:zbw:fubipe:202014

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    Web page: http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/oekonomie/ipoe/index.html

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