Shirking or mismatch? Coach-team separation in German professional soccer
AbstractSome authors suggest that firing a coach reflects a principal-agent problem between team managers and coaches. Another explanation emphasizes the matching problem between teams and coaches. This paper provides empirical evidence for the latter: Using German soccer league data, we analyze the determinants of coach dismissals in terms of the impact of a team's performance on the probability to be fired. It is shown that the probability for a coach dismissal increases over time. --
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Konstanz, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers, Series 1 with number 313.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
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