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The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability

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  • Gutmann, Jerg
  • Voigt, Stefan

Abstract

Prosecutors are immensely influential in every judicial system, yet very little is known about the impact of their organization. Here we ask two questions: (1) whether crimes committed by public officials are more likely to be prosecuted when prosecutors are independent, and (2) whether this effect depends on the integrity of the prosecutors themselves. We employ a novel indicator for prosecutorial independence based on data from the World Justice Project to answer these questions. We find that prosecutorial independence favors the prosecution of different types of public officials and this effect is conditional on the level of prosecutorial corruption. For police officers, we find that prosecutorial independence is not decisive, but prosecutorial corruption matters for whether suspected misconduct is likely to be prosecuted.

Suggested Citation

  • Gutmann, Jerg & Voigt, Stefan, 2017. "The Independence of Prosecutors and Government Accountability," ILE Working Paper Series 8, University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:ilewps:8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert C. Feenstra & Robert Inklaar & Marcel P. Timmer, 2015. "The Next Generation of the Penn World Table," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(10), pages 3150-3182, October.
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    3. Anne van Aaken & Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2010. "Do Independent Prosecutors Deter Political Corruption? An Empirical Evaluation across Seventy-eight Countries," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 204-244.
    4. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
    5. Voigt, Stefan & Gutmann, Jerg & Feld, Lars P., 2015. "Economic growth and judicial independence, a dozen years on: Cross-country evidence using an updated Set of indicators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 197-211.
    6. Stefan Voigt, 2016. "Determinants of judicial efficiency: a survey," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 183-208, October.
    7. Brambor, Thomas & Clark, William Roberts & Golder, Matt, 2006. "Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 63-82, January.
    8. Anne Van Aaken & Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt, 2004. "The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch -- A Conceptual Framework," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 261-280, September.
    9. Alon Harel & Keith N. Hylton (ed.), 2012. "Research Handbook on the Economics of Criminal Law," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13467.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt, 2023. "Militant constitutionalism: a promising concept to make constitutional backsliding less likely?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 377-404, June.
    2. Jerg Gutmann & Stefan Voigt, 2020. "Judicial independence in the EU: a puzzle," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 49(1), pages 83-100, February.
    3. Gutmann, Jerg & Voigt, Stefan, 2018. "The rule of law: Measurement and deep roots," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 68-82.
    4. Khalid Sekkat, 2022. "Have you been served, your honor? Yes, thank you, your excellency: the judiciary and political corruption," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 326-353, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Prosecutorial Independence; Prosecutorial Corruption; Government Accountability;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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